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The Vanishing Precedent: Eduardo Meets Vacatur
Jill E. Fisch,
I was sitting in my office, debating whether to get a second
cup of coffee before preparing for class, when there was a knock
at the door. I answered warily, anticipating yet another student
who wanted me to "explain" why he or she had done poorly on
the exam. Although the face at the door was vaguely familiar, it
did not belong to one of my students.
"Rodrigo?"1 I asked hesitantly. I could think of no reason why
Rodrigo would be coming to see me and wondered how he could
have become so confused as to be not only at the wrong
professor's office, but at the wrong law school.'
"I see you are acquainted with my brother," the visitor re-
plied. "I am often mistaken for him as he is, of course, so well
known among legal academics. I am Eduardo."
"I'm pleased to meet you, Eduardo. I didn't realize there was
* Associate Professor, Fordham University School of Law. BA, Cornell University,
1982; J.D., Yale Law School, 1985. I am indebted to Richard Delgado and Bill Eskridge
for their development and analysis of the narrative form and for inspiring me to direct
the use of narrative to a nontraditional setting-traditional doctrinal scholarship. This
article is, however, not the first to employ the dialogic method to explore the subject of
federal courts. See Henry Hart, The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal
Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic 66 HARv. L. REV. 1362 (1953). Thanks are due to Marc
Arkin, Mike Gerhardt, Dan Richman, Tony Sebok, Steve Thel, Bill Treanor, and my
mother for their helpful comments on earlier drafts and to Richard Delgado both for his
comments and for permission to use the Crenshaw family personae.
1 Rodrigo is the fictional interlocutor and title character in the Rodrigo Chronicles,
a series of narrative essays by Professor Richard Delgado. See Richard Delgado, Rodrigo's
Chronicle, 101 YALE LJ. 1357 (1992); Richard Delgado, Rodrigo's Second Chronicle: The Eco-
nomics and Politics of Race, 91 MICH. L. REV. 1183 (1993); Richard Delgado, Rodrigo's Third
Chronicle: Care, Competition, and the Redemptive Tragedy of Race, 81 CAL L. REv. 387 (1993)
[hereinafter Delgado, Rodrigo's Third Chronicle]; Richard Delgado, Rodrigo's Fourth Chronicle:
Neutrality and Stasis in Antidiscrimination Law, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1133 (1993); Richard
Delgado, Rodrigo's Fifth Chronicle: Civitas, Civil Wrongs, and the Politics of Denial 45 STAN. L.
REV. 1581 (1993) [hereinafter Delgado, Rodrigo's Fifth Chronicle]; Richard Delgado, Rodrigo's
Sixth Chronicle: Intersections, Essences, and the Dilemma of Social Reform, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 639
(1993); Richard Delgado, Rodrigo's Seventh Chronicle: Race, Democracy, and the State, 41
UCLA L. REV. 721 (1994); Richard Delgado, Rodrigo's Eighth Chronicle: Black Crime, White
Fears-On the Social Construction of Threat. 80 VA. L. REV. 503' (1994) [hereinafter Delgado,
Rodrigo's Eighth Chronicle].
2 The Professor, the questioner in the Rodrigo dialogues, is also a fictional charac-
ter, described as "a man of color teaching in a law school located in a large American
city . . . ." Delgado, Rodrigos Eighth Chronicle, supra note 1, at 504 n.8.
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another member of the Crenshaw family.' What brings you here?"
"Rodrigo suggested I seek you out. I have a problem and
could use your advice."
"You must be mistaking me for the Professor. I have no ex-
pertise in critical race theory or jurisprudence," I cautioned.'
Eduardo smiled. "Now you must be mistaking me for my
brother. Although I too am a lawyer, I am not an academic. I
practice law with the Legal Services Housing Project. My office is
right down the street. But my question is not about landlord-ten-
ant law. I understand you have some expertise on the subject of
vacatur."
I acknowledged that I had written on the subject.'
"An interesting problem has arisen in connection with my
representation of tenants in condemned buildings. I'd like your
reaction. May I take a few minutes of your time?"6
3 Eduardo and Rodrigo are half brothers of Geneva Crenshaw, the fictional activist
civil rights attorney described in DERRICK BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED: THE ELUSIVE
QUEST FOR RACIAL JUSTICE (1987). For personal background on Rodrigo, see Delgado,
Rodrigo's Third Chronicle, supra note 1, at 387 n.1. Like his siblings, Eduardo is a fictional
composite, reflecting concerns and observations expressed to me over the past several
years in connection with my work on vacatur.
4 Rodrigo's discussions with the Professor have focused on critical race theory. In
the past, the narrative form has been used primarily by nontraditional legal scholars
speaking as outsiders to standard legal norms. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Gaylegal Narra-
tives, 46 STAN. L. REv. 607, 608-09 (1994) (recounting examples and typical subject areas
of narrative scholarship). For further reflections on the role of narrative in legal scholar-
ship, see Richard Delgado, Storytelling for Oppositionists and Others: A Plea for Narrativ 87
MICH. L. REV. 2411 (1989); Daniel A. Farber & Suzanna Sherry, The 200,000 Cards of
Dimitri Yurasov: Further Reflections on Scholarship and Truth, 46 STAN. L. REV. 647 (1994);
Daniel A. Farber & Suzanna Sherry, Telling Stories out of School: An Essay on Legal Narra-
tives, 45 STAN. L. REV. 807 (1993).
5 See Jill E. Fisch, Captive Courts: The Destruction of Judicial Decisions by Agreement of the
Parties, 2 N.Y.U. ENVrL. L.J. 191 (1993) [hereinafter Fisch, Captive Courts] (analyzing use
of vacatur and related processes to destroy environmental law decisions); Jill E. Fisch,
Rewriting History: The Propriety of Eradicating Prior Decisional Law Through Settlement and Vaca-
tur, 76 CoRNELL L. REV. 589 (1991) [hereinafter Fisch, Rewriting History] (using economic
analysis to examine process of post-trial settlement and vacatur). In the interests of full
disclosure, I also informed Eduardo that I had written two briefs as Amicus Curiae to the
U.S. Supreme Court on the propriety of rules permitting routine vacatur of cases settled
during the appellate process. See Brief of Amicus Curiae Trial Lawyers for Public Justice
in Support of Petitioner, Izumi Seimitsu Kogyo Kabushiki Kaisha v. United States Philips
Corp., 114 S. CL 425 (1993) (No. 92-1123); Brief of Amicus Curiae Trial Lawyers for
Public Justice, P.C. in Support of Respondent, United States Bancorp Mortgage Co. v.
Bonner Mall Partnership, 2 F.3d 899 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. granted, 114 S. CL 681 (1994)
(No. 93-714).
6 Eduardo shares his brother's appreciation for the utility of dialogue as a form of
analysis, see e.g., Delgado, Rodrigo's Eighth Chronicle, supra note 1, at 531, to such a degree
that he is willing to take the tool beyond its traditional role as a means of adding out-
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"Of course," I replied. "Would you like some coffee while we
talk? I'm afraid I can't offer you the Professor's espresso,7 but our
faculty lounge has a serviceable coffee machine."
"I'd love some coffee, thank you. Black, please."
We settled back with matching mugs of strong black coffee,
and Eduardo began to recount his story.
I. DEFENDING THE HOMELESS OR How
EDUARDO ENCOUNTERS VACATUR
"For the past two years," Eduardo explained, "my office has
been involved in litigation on behalf of a group of homeless ten-
ants who are living in a condemned apartment building. In de-
fending the tenants against government action, we have argued
that the tenants, although squatters, have various privacy and prop-
erty rights in their housing that the government must respect."'
"Didn't I read something about this case in the Times?"
"Probably. Last summer we went to trial in the Southern Dis-
trict, and the court found in favor of our clients. The case was a
significant victory for the homeless and was prominently men-
tioned in the press."
sider perspectives and social commentary and extend it to more traditional legal analysis.
Eduardo's insight is not unprecedented. Legal scholars have valued the dialogic form for
hundreds of years. See, e.g., PLATO, THE REPUBLIC (F. Cornfeld trans. 1945) (describing
Socrates' use of dialogic questioning). Indeed, Socratic questioning remains the dominant
educational method employed by American law schools.
7 In keeping with the Professor's urbane image, his office contains such accoutre-
ments as a compact refrigerator and a machine that grinds beans and prepares freshly-
made espresso. See, e.g., Delgado, Rodrigo's Third Chronicle, supra note 1, at 388. One com-
mentator has read these possessions to indicate that the Professor has "sold out." See
Richard Posner, Legal Scholarship and Disciplinaiy Politics: Discussion, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1671,
1680 (1993).
8 The litigation described by Eduardo is fictional although both the subject matter
and the vacatur issue are based on events that have occurred in real litigation. See, e.g.,
Marvine Howe, Squatters Brace as City Focuses on East 13th Street, N.Y. TIMES, July 17, 1994,
§ 13, at 5 (discussing City's efforts to evict long-term squatters from city-owned build-
ings). For a general discussion of litigation on behalf of the right of the homeless to live
on public property, see Andrea Sachs, A Right to Sleep Outside?, 79 A.B,.A J., Aug. 1993, at
38. For an example of an attempt to use vacatur to remove precedents important to
public interest litigation, see Joint Motion to Grant the Petitions for a Writ of Certiorari,
Vacate the Judgment of the Court of Appeals, and Remand wi th Directions to Vacate the
Judgment of the District Court and to Remand the Case to the District Court for Con-
sideration of the Parties' Settlement Agreement, Shalala v. Schoolcraft, 114 S. Ct. 902
(1994) (Nos. 92-1392, 92-1395) [hereinafter Joint Motion, Schoolcrafi] (requesting Court to
vacate lower court decision upholding jurisdiction of federal courts to review manner in
which government evaluated claims for disability benefits); see also Schoolcraft v. Sullivan,
971 F.2d 81 (8th Cir. 1992).
19941
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"If your litigation was successful, what is the problem? Is the
city refusing to comply with the terms of the decision?"
"Not at all," Eduardo replied. "In fact, following the trial
court decision, various government officials met with us and
worked out housing placements for the tenants. Our clients are no
longer squatters, and the case has become moot.9 I think the
government was concerned, especially in an election year, about
the publicity generated by the decision. The housing officials want-
ed us to acknowledge publicly that the tenants' housing problem
had been addressed, which we did."
"It sounds as if you were able to reach a solution that met
everyone's needs," I observed.
"It seemed that way to me as well. But apparently the govern-
ment does not feel that it can live with the trial court decision.
The privacy rights established by our case would require the gov-
ernment to change its policies for treatment of the homeless in a
number of different ways. Although it provided our clients with
appropriate housing, the government simultaneously filed a notice
of appeal. Now the government lawyers have approached me and
asked if we will agree to settle the case and move to have the trial
court decision vacated. I'm not sure I understand what the signifi-
cance of vacatur would be or why, if the case is moot, either set-
tlement or vacatur is necessary."
II. MAKING DECISIONS DISAPPEAR OR How EDUARDO
LEARNS THE SIGNIFICANCE OF VACATUR
"I'm not surprised at your lack of familiarity with the practice
of postsettlement vacatur," I said. "Until several years ago,
postsettlement vacatur was virtually unknown in the profession.
Those who were using vacatur to destroy decisions and manipulate
case law were doing so in secret." 0
"We never talked about vacatur in law school," Eduardo ad-
mitted. "In fact, we discussed little in civil procedure other than
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23, but I went to Yale you know. Where do courts
9 Similarly, in Schoolcrafl the plaintiffs were awarded disability benefits while the
litigation was pending. The government then argued that the case was moot in an effort
to prevent the Eighth Circuit from addressing the jurisdictional issue. See Scholcraf, 971
F.2d at 83 n.3.
10 For example, when I explained the practice of postsettlement vacatur at a confer-
ence at New York University, the audience primarily indicated surprise at its existence. See
Colloquium on the Implications of Secrecy in Environmental Law, 2 N.Y.U. ENvTL L. REv. 187
(1993) (publishing the proceedings of the Colloquium).
[Vol. 70:2
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get the authority to vacate a final judgment?""
"The federal courts have both inherent power to vacate their
own decisions and statutory power from a variety of sources such
as Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)," I explained.
"Do you mind if I take notes on this?" Eduardo rapidly pulled
out a laptop computer.
"That's really a small one," I admired.
"It's been a time saver. So much of my practice involves field-
work, and I see so many clients in a day that I need to keep track
of things as they happen. You were talking about the courts' pow-
er to vacate?"
"The statutes and common law suggest," I continued, "that
vacatur is a means of addressing decisions that are defective or un-
just, either because of the circumstances under which they were
rendered or because of subsequent events. For example, Rule
60(b) allows a court, on motion, to vacate a judgment obtained by
fraud or mistake.12 Cases also suggest that vacatur is part of the
court's inherent power over its own judgments.""
"Appellate courts can also vacate lower court judgments,
right?" Eduardo inquired.
"Yes. The circuit courts and the United States Supreme Court
both have the power to vacate lower court judgments as part of
their general power of review. 4 In many cases settled during the
appellate process, the circuit court vacates the lower court judg-
11 A final judgment can result from a trial verdict or the resolution of a dispositive
motion such as a motion for summary judgment.
12 See FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b) (allowing relief, on motion, from a final judgment, or-
der or proceeding, for various reasons including fraud, mistake, newly discovered evi-
dence, or any other reason justifying relief). The circuit courts have not reached agree-
ment on whether Rule 60(b) permits courts to vacate sua sponte. See Clifton v. Attorney
General, 997 F.2d 660, 664 (9th Cir. 1993)' (discussing split in circuits).
13 See, e.g., Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 44 (1991) (district court has
inherent power "to vacate its own judgment upon proof that a fraud has been perpe-
trated upon the court"); In re First Fin. Dev. Corp., 960 F.2d 23 (5th Cir. 1992) (vacat-
ing own prior opinion and holding, sua sponte, for lack of jurisdiction); Tucker v. Amer-
ican Sur. Co., 191 F.2d 959, 961 (5th Cir. 1951) ("At common law a court has full con-
trol over its orders or judgments during the term at which they are made, and may, on
sufficient cause shown amend, correct, open, or vacate such judgments." (quoting 49
CJ.S. Judgments § 229 (1947))); Wood Bros. Constr. Co. v. Yankton, 54 F.2d 304, 309-10
(8th Cir. 1931) (discussing inherent power of court to vacate, sua sponte, judgment that
is void for want of jurisdiction or procured by fraud).
14 28 U.S.C. § 2106 (1994) provides:
The Supreme Court or any other court of appellate jurisdiction may affirm,
modify, vacate, set aside or reverse any judgment, decree, or order of a court
lawfully brought before it for review ....
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ment. Vacatur is not limited to district court judgments; courts
have been asked to vacate judgments after a circuit court decision
and even after the Supreme Court has granted certiorari." As to
the effect of vacatur, the black letter rule is that a vacated deci-
sion has no legal force or effect."1
6
"Vacatur makes sense if the court has rendered a defective
judgment," Eduardo observed, "such as when a litigant has de-
frauded the court. Under those circumstances, it also makes sense
that the decision should be completely eradicated. But I don't see
how it follows that the same rules should apply if a case is mooted
by settlement. Settlement doesn't necessarily indicate any defect
with the underlying judgment. 7 Why should it be erased simply
because the parties decide to terminate the litigation?"
"Well, the possibility of seeking vacatur when a case settled
pending appeal stemmed from the Supreme Court's decision in a
1950 case, United States v. Munsingwear,"5  I explained.
"Munsingwear was the second action brought by the government
alleging that Munsingwear had violated a price-fixing regulation.
The first action had been dismissed as moot after an initial trial
court judgment in favor of Munsingwear."
"So the government decided to try again."
"Yes. Munsingwear sought to have the second action dismissed
based on the res judicata effect of the first judgment. 9 In opposi-
tion, the government argued that res judicata did not apply be-
cause the first case had become moot during the appellate pro-
cess. 0 The Court refused to relieve the government from the res
15 See, e.g., Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co. v. Yanakas, 11 F.3d 381, 384 (2d Cir.
1993) (court asked to vacate judgment of the Second Circuit); infra notes 33-35 and
accompanying text (describing settlement of Bonner Mall litigation after Supreme Court
granted certiorari).
16 See, e.g., Chandler v. System Council U-19, No. CV85-AR-1948-S, slip op. at 4
(N.D. Ala. Oct. 20, 1986), available in LEXIS, Genfed Library, Dist File ("A decision
which is vacated has no precedential value, and for all intents and purposes never ex-
isted"). But see infra notes 71-73, 87 and accompanying text (discussing preclusive and
precedential effect of vacated decisions).
17 But see infra notes 140-47 and accompanying text (describing settlement as a possi-
ble response to an aberrational decision).
18 340 U.S. 36 (1950).
19 In the first suit, the United States sought only injunctive relief. After the trial
court found that Munsingwear's pricing complied with the regulation, the commodity in
question was deregulated, and Munsingwear successfully moved the court of appeals to
dismiss the case as moot. The United States then filed a second suit, covering a later
time period, and sought damages for violation of the regulation. See Munsingwear, 340
U.S. at 37 (describing procedural history of litigation).
20 The cases are in conflict regarding the appropriate disposition of a case that be-
[Vol. 70:2
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judicata effect of the judgment, holding that it could have protect-
ed itself by having the first judgment vacated when it became
moot.""
"That sounds more like a case about res judicata than about
vacatur," Eduardo observed.
"That's true," I acknowledged. "The Munsingwear opinion
contains some broad language about vacatur, however, suggesting
that vacatur is the Court's normal response to a case that becomes
moot during the appellate process.22 The government has recent-
ly argued to the Supreme Court that Munsingwear stands for the
general proposition that a court is required to vacate the judgment
in a case that becomes moot pending appeal.23 And there are
some cases in which the Supreme Court has followed that prac-
tice, although without explicitly considering its propriety."24
"That approach seems to go too far. Aren't most cases, even
those that result in a trial court judgment, ultimately resolved by
settlement? And a litigant can always render a case moot by com-
plying with the terms of the judgment.'s It's not logical to re-
comes moot during the appellate process. The general mootness doctrine requires dis-
missal unless one of several specified exceptions applies. See Kipp D. Snider, Note, The
Vacatur Remedy for Cases Becoming Moot Upon Appeal: In Search of a Workable Solution for the
Federal Courts, 60 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 1642, 1643-46 (1992) (describing exceptions to
mootness doctrine). Whether the court should also vacate its own judgment, or that of a
lower court, when a case becomes moot, is less clear. See infra notes 22-26 and accompa-
nying text. In determining whether mootness compels vacatur, courts have considered
variously the circumstances rendering the case moot, whether mootness occurred before
or after some level of appellate review, and whether the case is "certworthy." See, e.g.,
Clarke v. United States, 915 F.2d 699 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (en banc); id. at 709 (Edwards, J.,
dissenting) (discussing whether and under what circumstances decision to vacate judg-
ment is discretionary and distinct from finding of mootness).
21 Munsingwear, 340 U.S. at 41 (holding that government "slept on its rights" by fail-
ing to move for vacatur).
22 Id. at 39 ("The established practice of the Court in dealing with a civil case from
a court in the federal system which has become moot while on its way here or pending
our decision on the merits is to reverse or vacate the judgment below and remand with
a direction to dismiss.") (footnote omitted).
23 See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 4, Unit-
ed States Bancorp Mortgage Co. v. Bonner Mall Partnership, 2 F.3d 899 (9th Cir. 1993),
cert. granted 114 S. Ct. 681 (1994) (No. 93-714) [hereinafter U.S. Amicus Brief, Bonner
Mall] (arguing that federal courts are "required to grant a motion to vacate the judg-
ment below when a case becomes moot while the process of appellate review is ongo-
ing").
24 E.g., Great W. Sugar Co. v. Nelson, 442 U.S. 92 (1979) (per curiam); see Official
Transcript of Proceedings before the Court at 48 (Oct. 12, 1993), Izumi Seimitsu Kogyo
Kabushiki Kaisha v. United States Philips Corp., 114 S. Ct. 425 (1993) [hereinafter Tran-
script, Kaisha] (indicating that the Court had not focused on the precise implications of
Munsingwear for settled cases).
25 See In re Memorial Hosp., 862 F.2d 1299, 1301 (7th Cir. 1988) (finding case set-
1994]
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quire vacatur in all those cases,"26 Eduardo argued.
"Nor does that appear to be what Munsingwear held. In a
subsequent decision, Karcher v. May,' the Court held that the
Munsingwear language addressed cases that become moot through
'happenstance' and distinguished them from cases in which
mootness is caused by the voluntary actions of the parties."
2
1
"That distinction makes sense," Eduardo said. "It may be un-
fair to cause a party to be bound by a decision that it is prevented
from challenging through no fault of its own. But litigants volun-
tarily give up the right to challenge a decision when they settle
the case; that's simply the consequence of settlement.' I don't
understand," he continued, "the continued uncertainty about vaca-
tur. You referred to a pending Supreme Court case. If Karcher
clarifies the Munsingwear holding, why is the propriety of vacatur
still before the Court?"
"There is indeed a pending case, Bonner Mall,' in which the
Court will be faced with the question of whether Munsingwear ap-
plies when a case is settled pending appeal," I responded. "The
reason for the confusion is that the Munsingwear Court did not
directly consider the issue of when vacatur is appropriate.-" In
Karcher, the Court simply held that vacatur was not compelled by
Munsingwear, it did not conclude whether vacatur should be em-
ployed as a discretionary doctrine."
I
tied on appeal "neither more nor less moot than it would be if the loser were satisfied
with the judgment and complied without appealing").
26 But see Penguin Books USA Inc. v. Walsh, 929 F.2d 69 (2d Cir. 1991) (where pre-
vailing party deliberately took action causing case to become moot prior to appellate
review, court would vacate district court judgment sua sponte). The court explained:
"Were it otherwise, appellees could deliberately moot cases on appeal, thereby shielding
erroneous decisions from reversal." Id. at 73.
27 484 U.S. 72 (1987).
28 Id. at 83 (explaining that the "controversy did not become moot due to circum-
stances unattributable to any of the parties" and therefore "the Munsingwear procedure is
inapplicable . . ").
29 Accord Oklahoma Radio Assocs. v. FDIC, 3 F.3d 1436, 1439 (10th Cir. 1993)
("[s]ettlements are, by definition, attributable to the parties and not happenstance").
30 United States Bancorp Mortgage Co. v. Bonner Mall Partnership, 2 F.3d 899 (9th
Cir. 1993), cert. granted, 114 S. Ct. 681 (1994) (No. 93-714). The case was argued on
October 4, 1994. See Courts and Procedure: Automatic Vacatur Rule 63 U.S.LW. 3279 (Oct.
11, 1994) (describing oral argument).
31 In the oral argument of Bonner Mall, Justice Scalia characterized the pending case
as the first time the Court was considering the issue of vacatur upon settlement in an
adversary context. See Official Transcript of Proceedings before the Court at 22-25 (Oct.
4, 1994), United States Bancorp Mortgage Co. v. Bonner Mall Partnership, 2 F.3d 899




"Will the Court be doing that in Bonner Mal?" Eduardo asked.
"Possibly," I answered. "The Court originally granted certiorari
in Bonner Mall to consider a question of bankruptcy law. s' Before
the case was briefed or argued to the Supreme Court, the litigants
agreed to a settlement and confirmed a consensual plan of bank-
ruptcy organization. 3 The petitioner then advised the Court that
the case was moot because of the settlement and requested that it
vacate the lower court decision based on Munsingwear. The Court
responded by asking for briefing and argument on the question of
whether the rule in Munsingwear should be extended to cases that
become moot due to voluntary settlement pending appeal."'
"So the Court is likely to decide whether vacatur is mandated
when a case is settled pending appeal," said Eduardo.
"Or at least when a case is settled after a grant of certiora-
ri.' The Court attempted to consider the propriety of routine
vacatur more broadly last year in the Kaisha case, " ' I went on,
"but ultimately dismissed the writ of certiorari on standing
grounds,37 over the dissent of two Justices," without reaching
32 See United States Bancorp Mortgage Co. v. Bonner Mall Partnership, 2 F.3d 899
(9th Cir. 1993), cert. granted, 114 S. Ct. 681 (1994) (No. 93-714). The Court was to con-
sider the propriety of the new value exception to the absolute priority rule in bankrupt-
cy. For a description of the litigation history in Bonner Ma14 see David F. Pike, Stoel Rives
Attorney to Argue a "Hot" Issue of Proedure, WASH. J., Apr. 11, 1994, at 1.
33 Pike, supra note 32, at 1.
34 See Bonner Mall, 114 S. Ct. 1367 (1994) (directing parties to brief and argue the
following question: "Should the rule announced in United States v. Munsingwear, 340
U.S. 36 (1950), extend to cases that become moot in this Court because of the voluntary
settlement of the parties?").
35 See Reply Brief of Petitioner at 3, Bonner Mall (No. 95-714) (arguing that the case
only presents the issues of whether vacatur is appropriate for "certvorthy" cases that are
settled in the Supreme Court). Settlement of certworthy cases arguably presents unique
policy considerations because the Supreme Court's grant of certiorari may have indicated
that the lower court decision was worthy of review. Id. at 11; see also Clarke v. United
States, 915 F.2d 699, 713 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (en banc) (Edwards, J., dissenting) (distin-
guishing cases that become moot in the Supreme Court because further appellate review
of those cases is not a matter of right); cf. Joint Motion, Schookraft supra note 8 (re-
questing Supreme Court to grant certiorari for the sole purpose of vacating the lower
court decisions after case was settled during the pendency of petitions for certiorari).
36 See Izumi Seimitsu Kogyo Kabushiki Kaisha v. United States Philips Corp., 114 S.
Ct. 425, 426 (1993) (per curiam) (quoting question presented by Kaisha in petition for
certiorari as "Should the United States Courts of Appeals routinely vacate district court
final judgments at the parties' request when cases are settled while on appeal?").
37 Id. at 428 (dismissing writ of certiorari as improvidently granted because peti-
tioner was not a party to the appeal below).
38 Justices Stevens and Blackmun dissented from the dismissal and indicated that
they considered it appropriate to reach the merits and that, on the merits, they would
reverse the judgment of the Federal Circuit which had granted the motion to vacate.
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the issue of vacatur."
"One thing that confuses me about vacatur," Eduardo ob-
served, "is the jurisdiction of the courts. If settlement renders the
case moot, 9 as the litigants argue in Bonner Mall, there is no lon-
ger a case or controversy for Article III purposes.' How then
does a court have the authority for vacatur, an affirmative judicial
act beyond what is necessary to resolve the ongoing litigation?"4
"It is true that the decision on vacatur appears to be divorced
from resolution of the particular litigation before the court. 2 In
a sense, the court is simply articulating the future consequences of
its decision, an action that arguably extends beyond the proper
role of the judiciary. I think that issue may be broader than vaca-
tur, however, and depend on how you view the structural role of
the judiciary with respect to lawmaking generally."
"Isn't this question analogous to that raised by retroactivity in
adjudication?" Eduardo asked. "In cases in which a court applies a
new rule of law prospectively, the court has similarly divorced its
announcement of rules to govern future cases from the applica-
tion of those rules to the case before it."4'
"I don't see the relationship."
"It's two sides of the same coin," Eduardo explained. "When a
court announces a new rule of law but holds that its ruling will be
purely prospective, it is announcing a principle for future litigants,
not for the parties before it. When a court vacates a previous
judgment, it is announcing that its prior decision will not be the
law for future litigants, in spite of the fact that it had been ap-
plied to the parties in that case. In both cases, the court's decision
Kaisha, 114 S. Ct. at 428 (Stevens J. & Blackmun J., dissenting).
39 The settlement may also present Article III standing issues. See infra notes 115-30
and accompanying text.
40 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, ci. 1. The Supreme Court first suggested that the doc-
trine of mootness was based on the limitations of Article In in Liner v. Jafco, Inc., 375
U.S. 301, 306 n.3 (1964). See Evan Tsen Lee, DeconstitutionalizingJusticiability: The Example
of Mootness, 105 HARV. L. REV. 605 (1992) (tracing and criticizing origins of constitutional
component of mootness).
41 The Constitution requires the federal courts to dismiss cases that become moot
during the litigation process. See, e.g., Burke v. Barnes, 479 U.S. 361, 363 (1987) ("Article
III of the Constitution requires that there be a live case or controversy at the time that
a federal court decides the case . . . ").
42 The issues are separate so long as settlement is not conditioned on vacatur. See
infra note 47 and accompanying text.
43 SeeJames B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529, 547 (1991) (Blackmun,
J., concurring in the judgment); see also id. at 548 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judg-
ment) (questioning constitutionality of prospective adjudication under Article III).
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is concerned exclusively with the future consequences of the rule
of law rather than the resolution of a pending case."
"I suppose that is true," I admitted. "In retroactivity analysis
the debate seems to be between those who view the appropriate
role of courts as making the law and those, like Justice Scalia, who
argue that courts should 'find' the law."
"The characterization of judges as 'discovering' the law is
actually attributable to Blackstone,"" Eduardo pointed out. "Jus-
tice Scalia doesn't go quite that far. He is simply arguing for a
greater fidelity by the courts to textual analysis by calling for
judges to decide cases as though they were finding the law."4'
"Nonetheless your point is well taken," I said. "Carrying the
analogy through, by requesting vacatur, the litigants are asking a
court to 'lose' the law it has previously 'found.'" '
"Put in those terms, vacatur seems like a type of precedential
hide and seek," Eduardo observed. "Allowing routine vacatur also
seems inconsistent with the broader structure of adjudicative law-
making."
"That concern is more properly addressed to the propriety of
routine vacatur than to the courts' power to vacate. Vacatur does
raise a number of interesting policy issues."
"With respect to the courts' power, I suppose the Article III
issue can be avoided," Eduardo mused, "by litigants with a little
foresight. If the parties incorporated vacatur into the terms of the
settlement agreement or conditioned settlement upon vacatur, the
case would not be moot, and the court would be compelled to
resolve the motion."
"That's exactly what the litigants did in Nestle Co. v. Chester's
Market, Inc.,47 the leading Second Circuit decision on the propri-
44 See 1 WIL.LAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 69 (15th
ed. 1809) (expounding declaratory theory of adjudication). Although the view that judges
discover rather than create the law is generally attributed to Blackstone, a similar view
was expressed by Sir Matthew Hale 13 years before Blackstone was born. See Linkletter v.
Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 623 n.7 (1965) (citing GRAY, NATURE AND SOURCES OF THE LAW
206 (1st ed. 1909)).
45 James B. Beam Distilling Co., 501 U.S. at 549 (Scalia; J., concurring in the
judgment).
46 See Brief of Respondent at 36, United States Bancorp Mortgage Co. v. Bonner
Mall Partnership, 2 F.3d 899 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. granted, 114 S. Ct. 681 (1994) (No. 93-
714) [hereinafter Respondent's Brief, Bonner Mall] (characterizing request for vacatur as
"asking this Court to take the law that the Ninth Circuit has 'found' and, through vaca-
tar, to 'lose' that law so it may be found another day").
47 756 F.2d 280 (2d Cir. 1985).
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ety of postsettlement vacatur. The court in Nestle agreed that the
case was not moot and reached its decision by balancing the poli-
cies implicated by the motion. Because so many settlements explic-
itly address the issue of vacatur," I added, "it's possible that the
Supreme Court will move beyond the Munsingwear question and
address at least some of the policy considerations of postsettlement
vacatur."
III. SETTLEMENT TOOL OR BARGAINING CHIP? EDUARDO DEBATES
THE POLICY CONSIDERATIONS BEHIND ROUTINE VACATUR
"If vacatur is discretionary, the question is whether
Munsingwear should be extended to cases that are settled pending
appeal. Alternatively, what standard should the courts apply in
ruling on a motion to vacate?" I said. "This is the subject that has
generated the broadest disagreement among the lower courts."48
"Why is there so much disagreement?" Eduardo asked.
"Primarily because the courts differ on the policy reasons for
and against routine vacatur," I suggested.
"Let's talk about the policy arguments. I understand why a
litigant would seek vacatur-to erase the preclusive or precedential
effect of a decision with which the litigant disagrees. But why do
courts condone this manipulation?" Eduardo asked.
"There are several reasons why courts allow vacatur when a
case is settled pending appeal. Possibly the dominant rationale is
that vacatur is seen as encouraging settlement. This is the argu-
ment espoused by the Second Circuit, which would be ruling on a
motion to vacate in your case."49
"What do you mean? How can vacatur encourage settlement?"
"A number of circuit courts, like the Second Circuit, maintain
extensive settlement programs at the appellate level."0 These pro-
48 See Fisch, Rewriting History, supra note 5, at 602-06 (describing varying approaches
to motions to vacate taken by the Second, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits); see also
Clarendon, Ltd. v. Nu-West Indus., Inc., 936 F.2d 127 (3d Cir. 1991) (adopting general
policy against vacatur when case is settled pending appeal); In re United States, 927 F.2d
626 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (same); Federal Data Corp. v. SMS Data Prods. Group, Inc., 819
F.2d 277 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (favoring routine vacatur).
49 The motion to vacate when a case is settled after final judgment can be made ei-
ther to the district court that rendered the decision or to the circuit court once an ap-
peal has been filed. Fisch, Rawiting History, supra note 5, at 596-98.
50 See id. at 590 n.6 (describing programs used by circuit courts to encourage settle-
ment pending appeal); Judith Resnik, Whose Judgment? Vacating Judgments, Preferences for Set-
tlement, and the Role of Adjudication at the Close of the Twentieth Century, 41 UCLA L. REV.
1471, 1501-04 (1994) [hereinafter Resnik, Whose Judgment?] (describing development of
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grams are consistent with a strong policy of encouraging voluntary
settlement to conserve public and judicial resources." Obviously
one impediment to settlement on appeal is the adverse conse-
quences of the lower court decision for the losing party. If the
vitality of the decision can be negotiated away as part of the settle-
ment process, it will be easier to persuade the losing party to give
up its right to appeal."
"The losing litigant buys off its adversary in exchange for
freedom from any collateral consequences of the decision?" asked
Eduardo.
"That's right," I said. "Several circuits have adopted a policy of
expressly allowing vacatur as part of the settlement process in
order to encourage the settlement of cases pending appeal."
"Isn't encouraging settlement at the appellate level really a
false economy?" Eduardo questioned. "If the litigants know they
can routinely escape the adverse consequences of a trial court
decision through post-trial settlement and vacatur, the stakes of
going to trial are lower. I would think this would encourage liti-
gants to go to trial more often."
"I've made precisely that argument myself," I agreed. 2 "By
permitting vacatur, courts are making the risk of a trial less costly,
thereby reducing the incentive for early settlement. A recent study
of settlement rates in California lends support to this view. Profes-
sor Stephen Barnett studied settlement rates in the California
appellate courts and found that cases settled twice as often in the
one appellate division that refused to grant motions to vacate
when cases were settled after trial.""3
"And because the largest litigation expenses occur at the pre-
trial and trial stages, the delay in settlement until after trial is ex-
tremely costly,"' Eduardo observed. "So the rationale that vacatur
appellate settlement programs in response to judicial policy of encouraging settlement).
51 See generally Stephen McG. Bundy, The Policy in Favor of Settlement in an Adversary
System, 44 HASrMGS LJ. 1 (1992) (describing how the general U.S. policy in favor of set-
tlement has been expanded by various procedural innovations).
52 See Fisch, Reuniting History, supra note 5, at 635-38 (using economic analysis to
argue that availability of routine vacatur encourages litigants to delay settlement).
53 Stephen R Barnett, Making Decisions Disappear Depublication and Stipulated Reversal
in the California Supreme Court, 26 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1033 (1993).
54 This consumption of resources occurs to a substantial, albeit lesser, extent when a
case is resolved by a motion for summary judgment. Current litigation practices typically
involve the resolution of the majority of factual issues through pretrial procedures such
as discovery. To the extent that the litigants complete discovery and resolve the case
through a motion for summary judgment, that judgment is the result of substantial com-
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conserves judicial resources doesn't make sense as a reason to al-
low vacatur."55
"Well, deference to the request of the litigants, when they
settle a case and request vacatur, can be read more broadly than a
desire to conserve judicial resources," I said. "Vacatur is also con-
sistent with the view of litigation as a process driven by private
parties for the resolution of private disputes. By denying a request
to vacate in a case in which settlement is conditioned on vacatur,
a court is, in a sense, forcing the litigants to continue the litiga-
tion against their wills."5"
"I understand that litigation was traditionally conceptualized as
a private dispute resolution mechanism, but hasn't modem juris-
prudence evolved toward a more public law model? If you look at
cases like Brown v. Board of Education7 or Planned Parenthood v.
Casey,5" the point of the litigation is to develop and enforce social
norms, not to resolve the dispute in an isolated transaction."
"That certainly is one strand in the development of modem
civil litigation," I acknowledged, "and I think it extends beyond so-
called 'public interest' litigation. Even classically private areas of
law such as tort and contract litigation are now being viewed as
furthering societal goals. Toxic tort cases like asbestos litigation
alter societal safety and cleanup standards, 9 for example, and
mitment of resources as well. Moreover, a case may result in the creation of multiple
trial opinions and even appellate opinions prior to the completion of a trial.
55 See Benavides v. Jackson Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 820 F. Supp. 1284, 1288 (D. Colo.
1993) (The experience of "this and other district courts" demonstrates "that vacatur saves
far less in circuit court resources than, by its perverse incentive for litigants to stall on
settlement until after judgment, it costs the district courts and the parties.").
56 See Nestle Co. v. Chester's Mkt., Inc., 756 F.2d 280, 284 (2d Cir. 1985) (refusing
to deny vacatur on the basis that it would force litigants to continue litigation they were
willing to settle). There is support in other contexts for a court's power to review and
reject a settlement agreement as unfair. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 23.1 (providing for court
approval of settlement of shareholder derivative litigation); FED. R BANKR. P. 9019 (pro-
viding for judicial review of settlement of claims by and against bankruptcy estates); Ev-
ans v. Jeff D., 475 U.S. 717, 727 & n.13 (1986) (discussing judicial authority to authorize
class action settlements). Moreover, the courts have consistently imposed limitations on
litigants' ability to control their jurisdiction through stipulation. See, e.g., Dannenberg v.
Software Toolworks Inc., 16 F.3d 1073 (9th Cir. 1994) (dismissing appeal where litigants
attempted, by stipulation, to convert order of partial summary judgment into final appeal-
able order).
57 347 U.S 483 (1954) (The Supreme Court later addressed the remedial issue in
Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955)).
58 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992).
59 See PETER H. SCHUCK, AGENT ORANGE ON TRIAL: MASS TOXIC DISASTERS IN THE
COURTS 268-76 (1986) (explaining and distinguishing between public and private law
approaches to toxic tort litigation); see also Cass R. Sunstein, Judicial Relief and Public Tort
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products liability suits encourage manufacturers and sellers to
provide safer products.' One commentator has even argued that
the development of public values through litigation justifies free-
ing courts from the traditional case or controversy limitations on
their jurisdiction." 1
"That seems like an extreme position," Eduardo observed.
"It also reflects only one side of the public law/private law
debate.62 There's an equally compelling argument that courts are,
and should be, increasingly focusing on how to facilitate dispute
resolution. The appellate settlement programs I mentioned earlier
are simply one example of this trend. Look at the growth in alter-
native dispute resolution ("ADR") procedures such as arbitration
and mediation and the courts' reaction to those processes.'
Courts are not simply deferring to litigants' desire to use these
tools, they are actively encouraging and in some cases mandating
ADR. 4 In a recent case, a court tried to force the parties to un-
dergo a nonbinding summary jury trial as a means of inducing
settlement."'
"I suppose the increasingly litigious nature of U.S. society and
the scarcity of judicial resources encourage that outlook," Eduardo
said. "It's hard to understand why courts would accept a role pure-
ly as arbiters of private disputes. That characterization would seem
Law, 92 YALE L.J. 749 (1983).
60 See e.g., Richard L. Marcus, Public Law Litigation and Legal Scholarship, 21 U. MICH.
J.L REF. 647, 671 (1988) (explaining that the development of new theories of tort liabili-
ty alters the behavior of providers of goods and services).
61 Lee, supra note 40 (arguing that the "public values" model of litigation justifies
removing constitutional perspective from mootness and recasting the doctrine as purely
prudential).
62 See id. at 626-28 (explaining and contrasting "dispute resolution" model and "pub-
lic values" model of litigation). For a discussion of the public law model of litigation, see
generally Abraham Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HI.. L. REV.
1281 (1976) and Owen M. Fiss, The Supreme Court, 1978 Term Foreward: The Fornis of Justice
93 HARV. L. REv. 1 (1979).
63 See, e.g., Raymond J. Broderick, Yes to Mandatory Court-Annexed ADR, 18 LMG. 3
(1992) (describing development and use of court-annexed ADR programs).
64 Congress recently joined in the effort by enacting the Civil Justice Reform Act of
1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5089 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
28 U.S.C.), which requires each of the federal district courts to develop plans to promote
the reduction of "expense and delay" in civil litigation.
65 Strandell v. Jackson County, 115 F.R.D. 333 (S.D. Ill. 1987) (setting forth ratio-
nale behind order compelling summary jury trial and holding attorney in criminal con-
tempt for refusing to participate). The Seventh Circuit vacated the judgment of con-
tempt, holding that FED. R. CIrv. P. 16 did not permit courts to compel the parties to
participate in summary jury trials. Strandell v. Jackson County, 838 F.2d 884, 888 (7th
Cir. 1988).
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to diminish the prestige and importance of the judicial role. I
would think courts would be anxious to preserve the role of the
courts as lawmakers."
"In a way, arbitration and other forms of ADR do preserve
that role, by separating the dispute resolution process from the
traditional trial. The problem is that it tends to leave the courts
operating primarily as case managers."66
"But the emphasis on ADR should also increase the signifi-
cance of cases that go to trial," Eduardo countered. "If the courts
are wary of allowing the consumption of resources involved in a
full trial on the merits, they should be more interested in preserv-
ing the results of that trial."
"It does seem counterintuitive for a court that wants to dis-
courage the litigants from going to trial to allow them to erase
the result of the trial so easily."
"Preserving the judgment presumably has value in obviating
the need for future litigation by others," Eduardo continued.
"Absolutely," I agreed. "The doctrines of res judicata and
collateral estoppel are designed to preserve judicial resources by
preventing relitigation of issues that had been thoroughly aired in
a prior proceeding.67 Eliminating the preclusive effect of the
judgment is one of the primary reasons for seeking vacatur.'
"How important is the potential for preclusion in a court's
determination as to whether vacatur is appropriate?" Eduardo asked.
"It depends on the circuit," I answered. "The Federal Circuit
66 See genera//y Robert Peckham, The Federal Judge as Case Manager. The New Role in
Guiding a Case from Filing to Disposition, 69 CAL L. REV. 770 (1981); Judith Resnik, Mana-
gerial Judges, 96 I-Rv. L REv. 374 (1982).
67 See, e.g., Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979); Blonder-Tongue
Lab., Inc. v. University of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313 (1971). The doctrines of preclusion
also preserve finality. Id.; see also Munsingwear, 340 U.S. at 38 (stressing need for- doctrine
of res judicata to provide "terminal points for litigation"). The Court has continued to
reaffirm these values. See, e.g., Cardinal Chem. Co. v. Morton Int'l Inc., 113 S. Ct. 1967
(1993) (public values in resolution of patent validity justify preservation of judgment after
subsequent finding of noninfringement).
68 See, e.g., William D. Zeller, Avoiding Issue Preclusion by Settlement Conditioned upon the
Vacatur of Entered Judgments, 96 YALE LJ. 860 (1987). The plaintiff in Kaisha sought vaca-
tur for the very purpose of avoiding preclusion based on a jury trial in the Southern
District of Florida. At the time of the Supreme Court argument, a second tribunal, the
Northern District of Illinois, had relied on the Florida judgment to bar relitigation of
various issues; the Illinois court then reinstated the claims when the Federal Circuit vacat-
ed the Florida judgment. Kaisha, 114 S. Ct. at 429 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also Brief
for Respondent at 2-7, Izumi Seimitsu Kogyo Kabushiki Kaisha v. United States Philips




granted the motion to vacate in Kaisha over the direct objection
of the third party litigant who sought to rely on the judgment.69
Other courts will consider the existence of third parties who will
benefit from the judgment or future litigation that can be avoided
through preclusion doctrines in the vacatur decision. The Ninth
Circuit, for example, has enunciated a balancing test under which
the interests of third parties in the preclusive effect of the judg-
ment is one relevant factor.
70
"Should the courts' approach to motions to vacate really be
determined by concern about preclusion?" Eduardo asked. "I
mean, couldn't courts just continue to rely on vacated decisions
for preclusive effect?"
7'
"In fact, a few courts have done so, "72 I said. "Under current
practice, however, that approach is dangerous. After all, the vaca-
tur decision may be based on factors other than the settlement,
such as a defect in the underlying decision." Current methods of
69 See United States Philips Corp. v. Windmere Corp., 971 F.2d 728, 730-31 (Fed.
Cir. 1992) (denying Kaisha's motion to intervene and granting motion to vacate Florida
judgment despite its preclusive effect).
70 See National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Seafirst Corp., 891 F.2d 762, 769 (9th Cir.
1989) (denying motion to vacate because of utility of judgment in actions pending
against several other parties arising out of same transaction); Ringsby Truck Lines, Inc. v.
Western Conference of Teamsters, 686 F.2d 720, 721 n.1 (9th Cir. 1982) (applying bal-
ancing test and denying vacatur because trial court's findings had already been given
collateral estoppel effect in a second action).
71 The general rule is that vacated decisions have no preclusive effect for either res
judicata or collateral estoppel purposes. See Michael W. Loudenslager, Note, Erasing the
Law: The Implications of Settlements Conditioned Upon Vacatur or Reversal of Judgments, 50
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1229, 1247 n.168 (1993) (citing cases); see also Plaintiffs' Responsive
Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment upon Magis-
trate Judge's Reconsideration Thereof at 10-13, Levan v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc. (S.D.
Fla.) (No. 92-0325-CIV-ATKINS) [hereinafter Plaintiffs' Responsive Memorandum, Levan]
(arguing that cases vacated due to settlement have no preclusive effect).
72 See, e.g., Bates v. Union Oil Co., 944 F.2d 647 (9th Cir. 1991) (upholding applica-
tion of collateral estoppel effect to vacated judgment in Amos v. Union Oil Co., 663 F.
Supp. 1027 (D. Or. 1987), where record revealed that vacating judge had not considered
the effect of vacatur on judgment's preclusive effect); Chemetron Corp. v. Business
Funds, Inc., 682 F.2d 1149, 1187 (5th Cir. 1982) (giving collateral estoppel effect to trial
court findings resulting from two month bench trial that had been vacated as a result of
settlement, in Cosmos Bank v. Bintliff, No. 67-H-590 (S.D. Tex. 1975)). The Fifth Circuit
later stated that Chemetron has no precedential force. Hughes y. Santa Fe Int'l Corp., 847
F.2d 239, 242 (5th Cir. 1988); see also Fisch, Rewriting History, supra note 5, at 618-20 (dis-
cussing problems with Chemetron approach and noting the reasons why it has not been
widely followed).
73 Moreover, the parties' decision to settle may have been influenced by their per-
ception that the judgment was defective. See infra notes 140-47 and accompanying text
(discussing settlement as a response to an aberrational judgment).
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reporting frequently do not distinguish cases vacated solely as a
result of settlement from cases vacated on other grounds. Thus, a
court should reasonably be wary of concluding when a case has
been vacated that it nonetheless offered the losing litigant a 'full
and fair opportunity to litigate."' 74
"I can see the problem with having a court rely on a decision
that isn't really good law or on erroneous findings of fact,"
Eduardo acknowledged. "But this could be addressed by changing
our methods of reporting subsequent case history to indicate when
a case is vacated as a result of mootness or settlement,7' thereby
identifying when reliance by a subsequent court is justified."76
"Even that identification process might prove unreliable," I
suggested. "To what extent should a court indicate, in a decision
to vacate, its reservations about the validity of the original judg-
ment? Does a failure to record such reservations demonstrate a
willingness for the verdict to have preclusive effect?"
"Presumably many cases that are settled pending appeal pres-
ent legitimate appealable issues," Eduardo observed.
"But should the availability of a nonfrivolous appeal deprive
the verdict of validity if the appeal process is not completed?" I
asked.7
"I suppose it depends upon the extent to which the verdict is
defective."
"But how do we assess that?" I pressed.7' "For example, a
court in Florida recently vacated a jury verdict in a securities fraud
class action suit. Although vacatur was based on a settlement
74 Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 332 (1979) (internal quotations
omitted).
75 See Letter from Richard A. Givens to Matthew Cheney, Shepard's/McGraw Hill
(Jan. 26, 1994) (on file with author) (suggesting Shepard's adopt a case history symbol
indicating when a case has been vacated due to settlement).
76 Courts have been known to take precisely the opposite approach. For example,
the vacatur order in Bankers Trust Co. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 621 F. Supp.
685 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), states that the court was vacating its judgment so Hartford could
submit additional affidavits regarding Bankers Trust's motion for summary judgment. Id.
In fact, the parties had settled the litigation with the understanding that the trial court
would vacate its judgment based on the settlement. See infra notes 124-25 and accompany-
ing text (describing Bankers Trust litigation).
77 See Transcript, Banner Mal4 supra note 31, at 14 (counsel for U.S. Bancorp argu-
ing that, so long as court of appeals has not completed its review, decision of lower
court is not final); id. at 28 (argument by Solicitor General that Supreme Court's grant
of certiorari renders court of appeals' decision "tentative").
78 The Solicitor General urged the Supreme Court to adopt a procedure of partial
review in settled cases, in which it would determine if the matter were certworthy and, if
so, vacate without granting full review. See id. at 19.
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agreement, the court explicitly stated in granting the motion to
vacate that the jury verdict 'didn't comply with any of the
evidence' 9 and that the defendants had reasonable grounds for
appeal." Should those statements prevent a subsequent court
from giving the verdict preclusive effect?"
"It sounds as if there was a problem with the jury verdict,"
Eduardo said.
"Possibly. On the other hand, notwithstanding its articluated
reservations about the verdict, the court had previously refused to
grant a new trial or a judgment notwithstanding the verdict.81 Al-
though the court may have believed the verdict was defective, it
may also have been influenced by the parties' express desire to
prevent the verdict from being used in a related pending case. 2
If preclusion depends on how vacatur is labeled or whether it
appears to result from a defective judgment, savvy litigants are
going to attempt to control the record."
"And I suppose the same factors that lead courts like the
Second Circuit to grant initial requests for vacatur would cause
them to defer to litigants' requests regarding the subsequent desig-
nation of the case,"" Eduardo admitted. "In that case, a new la-
79 Transcript of Hearing at 13 (May 11, 1993), Purcell v. Bankatlantic Fin. Corp.
(S.D. Fla.) (Nos. 89-1284, 89-1605, 89-1850).
80 The court also issued a final judgment of vacatur in which it stated that it had
"serious reservations about the award and . .. the legal rulings upon which it is based."
Final Judgment Approving Settlement and Order of Dismissal at 4, Purcell
81 See Order on Plaintiffi' Motion to Amend Judgment to Add Prejudgment Interest
at 4, Purcell ("This Court cannot say that the jury's verdict was irrational or without
factual and evidentiary foundation, and has accordingly denied Defendants' motions for
judgment as a matter of law and in the alternative for a new trial in prior orders.").
82 At the time the Purcell litigation was settled, the parties were aware that the
Purcell verdict might have preclusive effect in Levan v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc. (S.D. Ha.)
(No. 92-325-CIV-ATKINS). The Purcell settlement agreement was conditioned on the court
both vacating the judgment and jury verdict in their entirety and "decree[ing] that such
verdict and judgment shall have no res judicata, collateral estoppel, or any preclusive
effect whatsoever . . . ." Stipulation of Settlement at 20, Purcell
88 An example of this deference can be found in the recent settlement of securities
fruad litigation involving Miniscribe. As part of a post-trial settlement of a lawsuit involv-
ing several major defendants in the litigation, the court agreed to sign decisions indicat-
ing that the prior jury verdicts were "not supported by sufficient evidence" and "contrary
to the great weight and preponderance of evidence." Andrew Pollack, Big Defendants Settle
in Miniscibe Lawsuit; N.Y. TIEiS, Feb. 19, 1992, at D4. According to Pollack's article, the
judge indicated in an interview that he had acted solely out of a desire to facilitate the
settlement. "'I did strike the jury verdict down but only as a result of the settlement, not
as an independent decision that the jury verdict was bad or anything.'" Id. Notably, at
the time of the settlement, there were several pending lawsuits based on the same
transactions, including a shareholder suit and an action by the Securities and Exchange
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beling method wouldn't solve anything. Moreover, if we allow
courts to rely on vacated decisions, aren't we depriving the liti-
gants of the benefit of their bargain? You just said that removing
the preclusive effect of a decision was a substantial factor in many
requests for vacatur."
"That's a fair point," I said. "If a court is going to defer to
the litigants by granting vacatur, it hardly seems appropriate to
take back part of the value of the settlement by allowing the judg-
ment to continue to have collateral effects." And if the Second
Circuit is correct in believing that vacatur encourages settlement, a
vacatur with reduced consequences will be less effective in achiev-
ing that objective, by making vacatur less of a 'bargaining
chip.'"'
"It would be even worse if reliance on vacated decisions var-
ied from case to case," Eduardo warned. 'With a uniform rule,
parties could assess the value of vacatur as part of the settlement
negotiation. How is a litigant to decide whether a settlement ad-
dresses problems such as the collateral consequences of the judg-
ment, if the litigant cannot determine what those collateral conse-
quences are?"
"You're right. Inconsistent use of vacated decisions would
inject additional uncertainty into the settlement process. Since
uncertainty is already the most significant barrier to settlement,a
6
courts would be making settlement more difficult and defeating
the rationale for permitting vacatur."
"I suppose if reliance on vacated opinions became sufficiently
widespread, vacatur would have little value to litigants considering
settlement after trial. This just takes us back to the initial question
Commission. Id.
84 See, e.g., United States v. Phillips, No. 922-6064, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 4643, at *6
n.2 (4th Cir. Mar. 9, 1993) ("The very purpose of vacating the district court's order is to
insure that no collateral consequences flow from an order which has escaped appellate
review on the merits.").
85 Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co. v. Yanakas, 11 F.3d 381, 385 (2d Cir. 1993)
(quoting In re Memorial Hosp. v. United States Dept. of Health & Human Servs., 862
F.2d 1299, 1302 (7th Cir. 1988)).
86 See Fisch, Reuriting History, supra note 5, at 634-35 (describing importance of infor-
mation about the value of case and likelihood of success in allowing parties to reach
settlement agreement); Robert H. Mnookin & Louis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow
of the Law: The Case of Divorce 88 YALE L.J. 950 (1979) (outcomes of settled cases are a
function of the parties' expectancies concerning the outcome at trial); Steven Shavell &
Louis Kaplow, Legal Advice About Information to Present in Litigation: Its Effects and Social
Desirability, 102 HARV. L. REv. 565, 594 (1989) (analyzing role of information about con-
sequences of litigation in settlement process).
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about whether or not vacatur is desirable."
"Well, remember that the value of a judicial decision is not
limited to preclusion," I said. "A judgment is a precedent, and the
effect of a precedent extends beyond a particular dispute. Vacatur
destroys that precedential value as well."' Of course, most re-
quests are for vacatur of trial court decisions'e which, although
they may have preclusive effect, are of little value as precedent."89
"Presumably, the value of encouraging settlement diminishes
once a case has generated not merely a trial level but also an
appellate decision," Eduardo observed. "I don't think you're right
to dismiss the importance of trial court decisions though. Is it
really true that these decisions are not valid as precedent? They're
cited all the time."' °
87 Most courts have assumed without detailed analysis that vacatur eliminates the
precedential effect of a decision. See, e.g., Izumi Seimitsu Kogyo Kabushiki Kaisha v. Unit-
ed States Philips Corp., 114 S. Ct. 425, 431 (1993) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (describing
routine vacatur as objectionable because judicial precedents are presumptively correct and
valuable and should not be eliminated at the parties' request); Manufacturers Hanover
Trust Co., 11 F.3d at 384 (refusing to allow vacatur of appellate court judgment where it
would allow "a party with a deep pocket to eliminate an unreviewable precedent it dis-
likes"); In re Memorial Hosp. of Iowa County, Inc., 862 F.2d 1299, 1302 (7th Cir. 1988)
(vacatur would improperly turn a precedent into the parties' property); Loudenslager,
supra note 71, at 1242-43 nn.132-35 (citing cases).
The government has also argued that vacatur renders a decision of no precedential
effect. See Transcript, Kaisha,. supra note 24, at 45. But see id. at 36-40 (debate during oral
argument in which effect of vacated opinion was described variously ranging from per-
suasive authority, the equivalent of a law review article, to binding on the same district
court under principles of stare decisis, to constituting the law of the circuit and binding
precedent). The effect of vacatur upon the precedential effect of a decision, was a prima-
ry subject of questioning during the Bonner Mall argument. See, e.g., Transcript, Bonner
MalU supra note 31, at 4-7, 21, 26-28.
88 The distinction in precedential value between trial and appellate court decisions
could justify application of a different standard to requests to vacate appellate court judg-
ments. See Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., 11 F.3d at 385 (distinguishing between trial
and appellate decisions and holding that, with respect to appellate decisions, the public
interest in preserving precedent takes precedence over the interest in encouraging settle-
ment). It would also be possible to distinguish cases that become moot in the U.S.' Su-
preme Court due to settlement from other appellate decisions. See supra note 35 (de-
scribing effort of petitioner in United States Bancorp to distinguish "certworthy" cases).
89 See, e.g., In re Smith, 964 F.2d 636, 638 (7th Cir. 1992) (district court decisions
have no precedential effect); Lee, supra note 40, at 668 n.3860 (stating although there is
some authority that, in the absence of higher authority, district courts should follow the
decisions of other district courts within the same state, the weight of authority is to the
contrary); Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at 25-26,
Izumi Seimitsu Kogyo Kabushiki Kaisha v. United States Philips Corp., 114 S. Ct. 425
(1993) (No. 92-1123) [hereinafter U.S. Amicus Brief, Kaisha] (characterizing precedential
value of district court decisions as "debatable").
90 Furthermore, many issues such as discovery disputes and other collateral orders
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"A case may be cited for its persuasive or informational value
without being a binding precedent," I said. "Witness the fact that
lower court decisions are cited to the courts of appeals and the
Supreme Court. Clearly those decisions aren't cited because they
are binding authority."91
"Does a decision have to be binding upon a court to consti-
tute a precedent?" Eduardo wondered. "I suppose I'm asking how
you define precedent before you discount the value of these dis-
trict court opinions."92
"I've always considered a precedent to be a prior decision that
the court deciding a particular case must follow; so, yes, I would
think a decision must be binding upon the court to be a prece-
dent.""3
"But surely the issue of how binding is a matter of degree,
which still makes any definition illusive," Eduardo persisted. "We
know, for instance, that lower courts routinely seek to distinguish
precedents that they do not want to follow. 4 Because subsequent
cases are rarely identical, the degree to which a precedent will be
binding is limited only by the creativity of the decisionmaker 5
Moreover the Supreme Court continues to vacillate on the degree
are rarely the subject of appellate decisions. See, e.g., Thomas J. Dougherty, 'Fraud on the
Market' Securities Class Action Certification Decisions, INSIGHTS, Apr. 1994, at 20 (describing
fact that although securities class action certification decisions have substantial impact,
they are rarely subject to appellate review). On these topics, district court decisions form
the entire corpus of decisional law.
91 Indeed, in its recent decision in Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate, 114 S.
Ct. 1439 (1994), the Supreme Court overruled decisions by all eleven federal courts of
appeals that had recognized aiding and abetting liability under § 10(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934. See John F. Olson et al., The End of the Section 10(b) Aiding and
Abetting Liability Fiction, INSIGHTS, June 1994, at 8 n.7 (citing circuit court decisions).
92 Any attempt to define precedent must include an examination of the vAues that
are promoted by judicial adherence to precedent, such as finality, coherence, fairness,
predictability and efficiency. See Henry P. Monaghan, Stare Decisis and Constitutional Adjudi-
cation, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 723, 748 (1988) (describing justifications for a system of adher-
ence to precedent). A full treatment of this subject is beyond the scope of this article.
93 See Evan H. Caminker, Why Must Inferior Courts Obey Superior Court Precedents? 46
STAN. L. REv. 817, 818 (1994) ("longstanding doctrine dictates that a court is always
bound to follow a precedent established by a court 'superior' to it"); Monaghan, supra
note 92, at 754-55 (arguing that, in some sense, a precedent must be binding upon a
subsequent court, but concluding that "binding authority" is a social construct without
some "immutable essence[]" and that the extent to which a precedent is binding de-
pends to a large extent on the role of stare decisis).
94 Cf Michael J. Gerhardt, The Role of Precedent in Constitutional Decisionmaking and
Theory, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 68, 106-09 (1991) (describing ability of Supreme Court to
weaken its own precedents through distinctions).
95 See Monaghan, supra note 92, at 765-67 (discussing degree to which courts can
distinguish precedents to avoid them).
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to which its prior decisions can be overruled 5 If, as Justice Mar-
shall has warned, the Court is reducing its fidelity to established
precedents, 7 it would seem to be inviting lower courts and legis-
latures to continue to challenge them."
"A number of recent scholars have gone even further and
suggested that inferior courts have no legal duty whatsoever to
obey hierarchical precedent,"" I acknowledged, "although I think
this is a fairly radical proposition."
"I agree. Speaking of radical, can I trouble you for more of
that excellent coffee?" Eduardo asked.
"It is a good coffee machine. When we decided to get a cof-
fee machine, we had so many debates about who would clean it
that we had to find a machine that didn't require daily mainte-
nance. The unexpected benefit was that this machine brews each
cup of coffee on request and to individual specifications."
"I like my coffee strong and high-test. I'm afraid I share my
brother's addiction to caffeine."' Cup in hand, Eduardo contin-
ued. "In addition to questions over the extent to which a prece-
dent is binding, I think there's a fair amount of debate over what
aspect of a decision constitutes precedent. Does the precedent
consist of the decision, the rules formulated by the decisionmaker,
and/or the reasons for those rules?"1"
"I'm afraid the coffee break threw me off," I said. "Why are
we debating the meaning of precedent?"
"I'm trying to understand the effect of vacatur on precedent,"
Eduardo explained, "and I'm having trouble with your character-
ization of vacatur as destroying the precedential value of a deci-
sion. Unlike preclusion, where a decision either is or is not bind-
96 See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992); Payne v. Tennes-
see, 111 S. Ct. 2597 (1991).
97 Payne, 111 S. Ct. at 2619, 2623 n.2 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (describing a variety
of Supreme Court decisions as "endangered precedents").
98 See, e.g., Caminker, supra note 93, at 820-21 (describing recent academic challeng-
es to the doctrine of hierarchical precedent); Gary Lawson, The Constitutional Case Against
Precedent, 17 HARv. J.L & PUB. POL'Y 23 (1994) (claiming that fidelity to the Constitution
is more important than fidelity to precedent); Michael Stokes Paulsen, Accusing Justice:
Some Variations on the Thmes of Robert M. Cover's Justice Accused, 7 J.L & RELGION 33, 85
(1990) (arguing that it is neither insubordinate nor improper for a lower court to repu-
diate the precedent of a higher court).
99 See Delgado, Rodrigo's Eighth Chronicle, supra note 1, at 524 (describing Rodrigo's
love of coffee).
100 See Monaghan, supra note 92, at 763-67 (describing the problem of defining pre-
cedent and the implications of different approaches).
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ing, precedent strikes me as a more flexible concept. This leads
me to conclude that vacated decisions can still have a role in the
development of the law through precedent."
"That goes back to my point that decisions have informational
value as well as precedential value," I said. "The many published
volumes of the Federal Supplement bear testimony to the importance
of judicial decisions beyond their role as precedent. The market
demonstrated by LEXIS and WESTLAW for unreported and un-
published decisions, many of which expressly lack precedential
value,1"' provides further evidence that the informational content
of decisions is important."
"What exactly do you mean by informational content?" asked
Eduardo.
"Judicial opinions have persuasive value, provide analysis for
future courts, and explain the application of the law to future
transactions. In other words, they explain the law."
"I agree that decisions provide a public value through their
legal analysis," Eduardo said. "But I think the informational value
of decisions extends beyond that analysis, which relates to my
point about the definition of precedent. Judicial decisions an-
nounce what the law is."
"What do you mean?" I asked.
"We've already talked about the fact that courts make law,
however one characterizes the process."
"Yes, and judicial precedents are the articulation of judge-
made law, in the same way that statutes constitute the law that'
results from the legislative process," I responded.
"Under positivism that's true,""' Eduardo agreed. "I don't
think positivism is useful for analyzing the law that results from
judicial decisions. An opinion isn't constructed like a statute. It
101 Unpublished decisions are reproduced on LEXIS and WESTLAW despite court
rules that, in many cases, limit or forbid their citation in subsequent litigation and deny
them precedential value. See generally William L. Reynolds & William M. Richman, The
Non-Precedential Precedent-Limited Publication and No-Citation Rules in the United States Courts
of Appeals, 78 COLUM. L. REv. 1167 (1978) (describing limited citation and non-publica-
tion rules in the federal courts of appeal). A trend to permit broader citation of unpub-
lished opinions appears to be developing. See Richard C. Reuben, New Cites for Sore Eyes,
A.B.A. J., June 1994, at 22 (reporting that the Tenth Circuit recently joined the Sixth
Circuit as the only federal appeals courts to allow citation of unpublished opinions). This
development does not, however, affect the use of such opinions as precedent Id. (quot-
ing Stephanie YL Seymour, Chief Judge of the Tenth Circuit, as stating that unpublished
opinions "are not binding and have only persuasive authority").
102 See, e.g., JEFFRIE G. MuRPHY & JULES L. COLEMAN, PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 19-33 (rev.
ed. 1990) (defining positivism).
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doesn't have the same clear scope of application to future situa-
tions."
"But judges clearly do articulate legal rules."
"The legal rules we deduce from judicial opinions don't really
come from the court's description of the rule. I think it's more
accurate to describe judicial lawmaking as common law adjudica-
tion," Eduardo suggested.
"How is that different?" I asked.
"Common law atdjudication involves the development of legal
rules through generalization from a series of analogies.103 In
order to find the rule applicable to a given transaction, we look at
the cases to locate similar transactions. In other words, cases give
us a series of discrete examples of the application of a general
principle to a fact pattern. The examples themselves provide the
meaning for the general rule."
"That sounds like a fairly accurate way of describing the use
of precedent," I acknowledged.
"The general principle extends beyond the adjudicative pro-
cess," Eduardo conceded. "The process of developing the meaning
of a rule from a series of discrete examples has been explored by
everyone from Wittgenstein to Sesame Street."
"Okay, let's start with the easy one. How is adjudication like
Sesame Street?" I asked.
"Martha Minow, I think, is the source of this explanation." 4
Minow explains that the little game they play on Sesame
Street-'one of these things is not like the others'-exemplifies
the type of analysis used by lawyers. What she means, I think, is
that when we use case research to find the rule of law applicable
to a particular situation we look for cases that are similar in rele-
vant aspects to that situation. When presented by an opposing
precedent, we seek to distinguish it by saying it is 'not like the
others' in the relevant way:"
"I remember hearing about the reference to Sesame Street.
Didn't Minow discuss this in an address to the annual meeting of
the Association of American Law Schools?""0 5 I asked.
103 See Linda Meyer, "Nothing We Say Matters:" Teague and New Rules, 61 U. CHI. L.
REV. 423, 465-76 (1994) (describing the character of common-law adjudication).
104 See MARTHA MINOW, MAYUNG ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, EXCLUSION AND
AMERIcAN LAW 1 (1990) (describing the game played on Sesame Street as reflecting how
lawyers think).
105 Minow has used the example in several of her works, including a speech given
before the Association of American Law Schools at its annual meeting on January 4,
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"I don't know the exact source, but Minow's point is that
legal reasoning involves reasoning by analogy," Eduardo respond-
ed. "Minow went on to consider the difficulties with this reasoning
process, particularly the problem with determining when a given
case was or was not 'like the others.' In other words, when does
difference matter?"
"Your point then is the existence of past decisions matters,
whether or not they are technically controlling, in order to pro-
vide guidance for future actors with respect to the legal conse-
quences of their primary conduct?"
"Exactly. We develop an understanding of the rule through
observing the results in a series of examples. Wittgenstein explains
the process of understanding concepts in this manner throughout
much of Philosophical Investigations.""°6
"I thought you weren't an academic. I admit that I'm a little
surprised to hear a legal services lawyer citing Wittgenstein."
"I am a Crenshaw, after all,"" 7 Eduardo reminded me. "I
was also a math major in college. For a mathematician,
Wittgenstein's writing is particularly fascinating. Both his material
on the meaning of language and his mathematical examples dem-
onstrate that a series of examples can convey understanding even
of concepts for which a formal rule cannot be articulated. Think
about how we understand the meaning of the color 'green.' Can
you define green? Not easily. But you can convey the concept of
green quite readily through a series of examples."
"I don't think green is a concept."
"Okay, so I'm not as much of a philosopher as my brother,"
Eduardo admitted. "Let's try to avoid the quagmire of philosophi-
cal debate. The idea is that some things that are not subject to a
precise definition can nonetheless be understood through exam-
ples."
"And the more examples you have, the better your under-
standing of the underlying concept. I see where you're going with
1991. For the text of this speech, see Martha Minow, Differences Among Difference, 1 UCLA
WOMEN'S L]. 165 (1991).
106 See generally LUDWIG WrrrGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS (G.E.M.
Anscombe trans.) (Macmillan 3d ed. 1969) (explaining that our understanding of the
meaning of words, rules, and other abstractions is derived from generalization about
discrete events).
107 Eduardo's siblings are extremely well read and cite to such authorities with ease.
See, e.g., Delgado, Rodrigo's Fifth Chronicle, supra note 1, at 1585-1605 (in which Rodrigo
discusses Aristotle and Hegel).
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this. If the informational content of decisions is so substantial,
removing them is costly."
"Exactly," Eduardo agreed. "The problem I have with this
argument is that, if the cases are relevant for their informational
content rather than their technical value as precedent, vacatur
seems relatively less important. Vacating a case shouldn't destroy
its persuasive value. And courts frequently rely on nonbinding
authorities such as law review articles for their reasoning. Finally,
the opinion remains as a guide for future litigants seeking to
predict how judges will decide the relevant issues."
"The same concerns that we talked about earlier regarding
the use of vacated decisions for preclusion may affect a court's
willingness to rely on a vacated case for its precedential and/or
informational content," I replied. "A more serious concern is that
vacatur is usually connected to other methods of hiding or erasing
an opinion, such as depublication, withdrawal or
expungement."1 8
"You mean the vacated opinion actually disappears from the
case reporters?" Eduardo asked.
"Precisely. If the judgment is vacated before the publication of
the permanent reporter volume, there will simply be a citation in
the published volume indicated that the opinion, previously pub-
lished at that location in the advance sheet, has been vacated."1°9
"But even unpublished opinions appear on LEXIS and
WESTLAW."
"Both on-line reporting services have similar policies to that of
West and will usually removel° cases that are vacated and do not
108 See Transcript, Kaisha, supra note 24, at 37 (question by Justice Ginsburg indicat-
ing that, if vacated opinion is caught in time, it will not be published in the official
reporters).
109 For an illustration of this process, see the following entry in the official reporter
EDITOR'S NOTE: The opinion of the United States District Court, S.D.N.Y.,
Mason Tenders Council Welfare Fund v. Akaty Construction Cop., published in the
advance sheet at this citation, 724 F. Supp. 209-224, was withdrawn from the
bound volume because the opinion was vacated and withdrawn by order of the
Court.
724 F. Supp. 209. As this example illustrates, unless a researcher had examined (and pre-
served) the West advance sheets, she would be unlikely to discover that this case involved
the relitigation of an issue which had been decided in an earlier lawsuit involving the
same plaintiff. The prior lawsuit had also been vacated. Mason Tenders Dist. Council
Welfare Fund v. Dalton, 648 F. Supp. 1309, vacated upon request of the parties, 648 F. Supp.
1318 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
110 The on-line services have procedures for determining which cases are placed on-
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appear in the official reporters."' Of course, if vacatur is delayed
until the case is published in the bound volume of the reporter,
the opinion will remain available. But vacatur has the potential to
destroy even the informational value of a case by causing it to
disappear without a trace.
1 2
"So even if the Supreme Court were to decide to accord
precedential value to vacated opinions, future litigants might be
unable to find the relevant precedents?" Eduardo asked.
"That's fight."
"I suppose litigants could also take the next logical step and
provide in their settlement agreement that the motion to vacate
will also seek depublication or withdrawal of any preliminary pub-
lished opinion,""' Eduardo observed.
"If a court is willing to grant vacatur on the theory that it
promotes settlement, I expect it would be equally receptive to a
motion to depublish,""4 I said.
"Isn't there a way that future beneficiaries of the decision can
prevent its destruction by objecting to vacatur or intervening in
the motion to vacate?"
"Courts face one obvious difficulty in ruling on motions to
line. They report that they sometimes continue to publish cases that have been vacated.
See Resnik, Whose Judgment?, supra note 50, at 1497-1500 (describing publishing practices
of LEXIS and WESTLAW). It is rare to find a case included on-line that has been re-
moved from the official reporter.
111 See Fisch, Reuriting History, supra note 5, at 620 n.163 (describing the general
practice whereby vacated opinions are withdrawn from the online Reporting Services
(LEXIS and WESTLAW) as well as from the bound editions of the federal reporter).
112 Because vacated cases can be rendered invisible, it is impossible to determine the
extent to which useful decisions are being destroyed. For example, one commentator has
been misled into arguing that the relitigation costs associated with vacatur are insubstan-
tial because of the absence of reported decisions involving relitigation. Henry E.
Klingeman, Note, Settlement Pending Appeal: An Argument for Vacatur, 58 FORDHAM L. REV.
233, 249-50 (1989). As the previous example demonstrates, the destructive effect of vaca-
tur makes this conclusion unreliable.
113 See, e.g., Oklahoma Radio Assocs. v. FDIC, 3 F.3d 1436 (10th Cir. 1993) (indicat-
ing that the parties' settlement agreement contemplated withdrawal of the court's opinion
as well as vacatur).
114 Publication of federal court opinions is at the discretion of the judge rendering
the opinion. The vast majority of trial court opinions are not published. See Jack B.
Weinstein, Factors in Determining the Degree of Public Availabili, of Judicial Opinions, 2 N.Y.U.
ENVTL. LJ. 244 (1993) (describing publication system and factors considered by judges in
publication decision). Some state systems of depublication are more elaborate. For exam-
ple, the California rules of court allow the California Supreme Court to order that a
lower court opinion not be published. CAL. R. Cr. 976(c)(2) ("An opinion certified for
publication shall not be published . . . on an order of the Supreme Court to that ef-
fect."); see Fisch, Captive Courts, supra note 5, at 192 n.7 (describing California's
depublication rules); Loudenslager, supra note 71, at 1239 n.100 (same).
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vacate: determining the significance of the decision for future liti-
gants. For example, the Ninth Circuit's balancing test requires the
court to consider the impact on future litigants and suggests that
vacatur is improper if the decision has substantial precedential or
preclusive value. But how is the court to ascertain the future value
of the decision? Future beneficiaries are seldom present before
the court; they may not even be aware of the decision.""5
"If the future parties can somehow be located, are they per-
mitted to defend the decision's precedential or preclusive value in
the context of the court's ruling on the motion?"
"Sometimes," I replied. "In one fairly recent case, the Ninth
Circuit allowed intervention by third parties who eventually bene-
fited from the collateral estoppel effect of the decision. 16 In
Kaisha, on the other hand, the Federal Circuit denied Kaisha's
motion to intervene to oppose vacatur, and the Supreme Court
ultimately dismissed the case for lack of standing."""
"An attempt by a third party to intervene does present an
unusual standing issue," Eduardo observed. "On one hand, the
standing doctrine articulated in Lujan"8 would seem to preclude
intervention. Subsequent litigation by or against third parties
would seem to be the kind of 'conjectural' harm"' that does not
give rise to a case or controversy, 2 ° especially since it would be
difficult for a court, in ruling on a motion to vacate, to ascertain
whether its decision will actually be given preclusive effect in a
later proceeding, the parameters of which have not yet been de-
termined.""
115 This was one basis for the Second Circuit's refusal to allow the potential interest
by third parties in the preclusive value of the decision to defeat a motion for vacatur. See
Nestle Co. v. Chester's Mkt., Inc., 756 F.2d 280, 284 (2d Cir. 1985) (finding the interests
of "hypothetical" future litigants to be speculative).
116 National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Seafirst Corp., 891 F.2d 762, 764 (9th Cir. 1989).
117 The Supreme Court found that Kaisha had failed to preserve for review the pro-
priety of the Court of Appeals' denial of the motion to intervene. Izumi Seimitsu Kogyo
Kabushiki Kaisha v. United States Philips Corp., 114 S. Ct. 425, 428 (1993). In dissent,
Justice Stevens argued that the intervention issue was fairly included in the question pre-
sented for certiorari and further, that if routine vacatur was improper, Kaisha had a
sufficient stake in the outcome of the motion to vacate to justify intervention. Id. at 429
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
118 Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S. Ct. 2130 (1992).
119 Id. at 2136 (explaining constitutional minimum of standing as including require-
ment that plaintiff's injury be "actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical")
(citations and internal quotations omitted).
120 Id. ("[T]he core component of standing is an essential and unchanging part of
the case-or-controversy requirement of Article III.").
121 Id. (explaining standing requirement that it be "likely" as opposed to "speculative"
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"Nor, since the first court cannot control the subsequent
preclusion decision, does the potential harm from vacatur appear
to be redressable.'" The first court cannot require a later court
to apply collateral estoppel, even if it has refused to vacate," I
said.
"On the other hand, the third parties potentially affected by
the decision to vacate are really more legitimate defenders of the
judgment than the original litigants," Eduardo continued.
"What do you mean?"
"A motion to vacate doesn't present the normal adversarial
situation. Instead of having one party on each side of the issue,
both parties support, or at least accept, vacatur.' Indeed, I
would think that a winning litigant would be able to extract a
more favorable settlement in exchange for its support of vacatur.
This gives both parties an incentive to persuade the court that
vacatur is desirable and leaves no one to defend the judgment."
"In fact, I've heard of a case where that's just what hap-
pened," I agreed. "An insurance pollution case resulted in a find-
ing that the insurance company was liable. The case was then
settled and vacated.' Through an unusual circumstance, the
terms of the settlement came to light seven years later in another
litigation, and it was revealed that the defendant insurance compa-
ny had agreed in the settlement to pay $200,000 more than the
amount of the plaintiffs claim in order to destroy the adverse
district court judgment.""z
"Unfortunately, not every decision worth defending has poten-
tial preclusive value," Eduardo went on. "Even if courts interpret
the injury requirement of Lujan sufficiently broadly to grant stand-
ing to litigants seeking to preserve the collateral estoppel effect of
a judgment, there won't be anyone to defend a decision that is
simply an important precedent. Intervention for that purpose
that plaintiffs injury "will be redressed by a favorable decision.") (citations and internal
quotations omitted).
122 Id. at 2140-42 (describing the redressability requirement of standing); Duke Power
Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 74-75 (1978) (same).
123 Indeed, counsel for Bonner Mall acknowledged at oral argument that his defense
of the Ninth Circuit decision was not based on the partnership's future interest in the
decision and that he was really arguing as a "friend of the Court." Transcript, Bonner
Mall, supra note 31, at 47-48.
124 Bankers Trust Co. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 518 F. Supp. 371, vacated,
621 F. Supp. 685 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
125 See Intel Corp. v Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 692 F. Supp. 1171, 1192 n.32
(N.D. Cal. 1998) (describing terms of settlement agreement in Bankers Trust).
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would certainly be denied for lack of standing."'26
"A litigant or future litigant's interest in a precedent presum-
ably does not constitute the type of tangible interest that gives rise
to standing,"' I observed. "Allowing intervention on this basis
would open the courthouse doors by granting standing to
nonparties for the purpose of appealing decisions with which they
disagree, as well as prolonging the appellate process beyond the
resolution of the dispute."2
"Suggesting that Article III would bar such claims," Eduardo
responded. "But if seeking to defend a judgment because of its
precedential value is an insufficient interest to confer standing,
doesn't the converse hold true? Wouldn't Article III prevent liti-
gants from seeking-and courts from granting-vacatur of a set-
fled case for the purpose of destroying its precedential effect?'
And isn't the court's order in such a case merely an advisory opin-
ion with respect to the continuing value of the decision as prece-
dent?"'
"Put that way, vacatur seems even less defensible," I agreed.
"It really seems as if routine vacatur allows the parties to create a
market in precedents. And part of the point of a system of prece-
dent is that the parties don't have to keep coming back to court
on the same issue."
126 See In re Smith, 964 F.2d 636, 638 (7th Cir. 1992) (discussing fact that allowing
intervention by litigants simply seeking to attack or defend the precedential value of a
decision would violate Article HI).
127 See O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 493-95 (1974).
128 Litigation by nonparties about the precedential value of a decision would appear
to be litigation about the opinion rather than the judgment to which it is attached, be-
cause the intervenors are not aggrieved by the judgment. See Transcript, Kaisha, supra
note 24, at 34 (argument by appellee distinguishing between vacating opinions and vacat-
ing a judgment); id. at 36 (question by Justice Ginsburg) ("What would the status of an
opinion stripped of the underlying-of the ultimate judgment be?"); id. (answer by ap-
pellee to subsequent question by Justice Scalia) ("the precedential effect. . . comes from
the judgment, not from the opinion, that the opinion is the rationale behind the judg-
ment, but the judgment is what is the precedential effect").
129 See New Jersey v. Heldor Indus., 989 F.2d 702, 710 (3d Cir. 1993) (Nygaard, J.,
concurring and dissenting) (basis of appeal or motion to vacate is an order, not an opin-
ion; federal courts do not have the power to vacate an opinion where a party is not
aggrieved by the order to which it is attached).
130 Cf. Reich v. Contractors Welding, 996 F.2d 1409, 1412-13 (2d Cir. 1993) (The
Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission sought to preserve the underlying
reasoning of a vacated order as valid precedent, based on its conclusion that, in spite of
the vacatur which resulted from settlement, its analysis in the decision remained correct.
Because the Commission's opinion was issued after the parties had reached a settlement,
the court concluded that it constituted an improper and unauthorized advisory opinion.).
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
"Not just the parties," Eduardo corrected me. "Remember
your point that third parties benefit from a judicial decision, both
through preclusion and precedent. Presumably that means third
parties can also suffer from an adverse decision."
"Third parties can't be bound by principles of preclusion if
they weren't a party to the lawsuit," I reminded him.
"They could be considerably affected by an adverse precedent,
though. I would think that certain litigants or industry groups who
expect to contest particular issues regularly would have a substan-
tial stake in the development of case law in their area and would
be willing to pay to make that development more favorable.""'
"You're saying an industry group or institutional litigant un-
connected with a particular lawsuit would get involved financially
in order to control the development of case law that would affect
it in the future?"3 2 I asked.
"Why not? Even if the losing litigant isn't a repeat player and
is therefore unconcerned whether the precedent remains on the
books, there is nothing to preclude a third party interested in the
precedent but otherwise unrelated to the litigation from contribut-
ing the money necessary to effectuate a settlement on appeal for
the purpose of having the precedent vacated."
"So you think routine vacatur would operate
disproportionately to favor wealthy litigants," I said.
"Absolutely. The legal system is already skewed in favor of the
wealthy, who have greater access to the courts and to legal advice.
Precedent allows those with a lesser degree of access to enjoy the
benefits of legal rules. Through vacatur, those who are likely to
face an issue repeatedly in litigation can eradicate or at least re-
tard the development of unfavorable rules and then argue to the
courts that the weight of authority is in their favor."5
"There is clear evidence of insurance companies purposefully
using vacatur in precisely this way," I added." "And I'm sure it
is equally possible in other industries."" 5
131 See Loudenslager, supra note 71, at 1242-43 (describing interest of institutional lit-
igants in controlling the development of precedent).
132 See Marc Galanter, Why the Haves Come Out Ahead: Speculation on the Limits of Legal
Change, 9 LAW & Socly REV. 95 (1974) (describing litigation objectives of "repeat players"
as including development of particular regime of rules as well as case-specific outcomes).
133 See Loudenslager, supra note 71, at 1242 (citing arguments used by institutional
litigants about the "weight of authority").
134 See Fisch, Captive Courts, supra note 5, at 205-07 (describing efforts of insurance
industry to control development of insurance law through vacatur and related practices).
135 See, e.g., Respondent's Brief, Bonner Mall supra note 46, at 35 n.19 (suggesting
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"Think of how interested the tobacco industry would be, for
example, in maintaining a record of successfully defending all
claims against it and erasing any decision imposing liability." By
erasing and hiding any adverse decision, the industry perpetuates
the myth that smoking isn't dangerous and that tobacco compa-
nies aren't responsible for its harms. The cost for the industry
would be tiny, and the effect would be a manipulation of the
judicial system."
"Why do you consider it manipulation?" I inquired.
"Of course it is manipulation for wealthy repeat litigants to
buy and sell judicial precedents," Eduardo exclaimed. "I admit to
a bias against well funded institutional litigants, because so much
of my practice is based on trying to redress the damage they do
to the poor and uninformed, but I don't think I'm wrong about
vacatur favoring the rich. Only a litigant with substantial funds can
afford settlement and vacatur. A poor litigant unhappy with a
lower court decision is forced to hope his or her appeal will be
successful. Some litigants can't even afford the cost of that ap-
peal."
"That's true," I admitted. "On the other hand, a poor litigant
who is successful at the trial level may benefit from the availability
of vacatur. Consider, for example, the case of George Neary, who
sued the University of California and won a multimillion dollar
verdict at trial."3 7 The case dragged on for twelve years before
trial, and Neary, who was getting on in age, was tired of the litiga-
tion. When the defendants agreed to settle the case pending ap-
peal,"s Neary was happy to agree to the settlement, which would
both reduce the uncertainty of collecting, prevent him from incur-
ring further litigation costs, and, most importantly, get him the
money right away." 3 9
that a banking industry trade group interested in erasing the lower court precedent
could easily contribute the money necessary to effectuate a settlement on appeal even if
U.S. Bancorp itself was uninterested in seeking vacatur).
136 See Fisch, Rewriting Histo, supra note 5, at 622 n.174 (describing successful track
record of tobacco industry in cigarette litigation).
137 The jury verdict was seven million dollars. Neary v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 278
Cal. Rptr. 773 (Ct. App. 1991), rev'd, 834 P.2d 119 (Cal. 1992).
138 The settlement was conditioned on the court granting the parties' motion for
stipulated reversal of the jury verdict. The California Court of Appeals refused to grant
the motion. See Neary, 278 Cal. Rptr. 773. Its decision was reversed by the California Su-
preme Court. Neary v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 834 P.2d 119 (Cal. 1992).
139 See Fisch, Captive Courts, supra note 5, at 198-99 (describing the Neary litigation);
Loudenslager, supra note 71, at 1238-42 (same).
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"Don't you see how vacatur simply increases a wealthy
defendant's ability to make use of his or her leverage? The cost of
litigation, the further cost and delay of the appellate process,
already operate to favor the wealthy. With vacatur available, the
one potential downside for a litigant who refuses to settle before
trial-the risk of an unfavorable adverse judgment with conse-
quences extending beyond the present case-has been removed. A
litigant with the resources to pursue litigation can outwait an ad-
versary, secure in the knowledge that if it goes to trial and loses, it
can erase the consequences."
'You seem to be assuming that settlement and .vacatur stem
from a litigant's unjustified failure to settle promptly. Think for a
moment about the counterargument," I pressed. "Couldn't settle-
ment on appeal result, in part, from the fact that the lower court
decision is aberrational?4 ' If the successful litigant recognizes
that the victory is unlikely to survive appeal, he or she has a great-
er incentive to settle. Moreover, the losing litigant may be willing
to pay some amount in settlement, even if the prospects on ap-
peal look good, to avoid further litigation costs. In these cases,
settlement operates as a form of compromise verdict. 4' By allow-
140 Brainerd Currie's famous railroad hypothetical illustrates one possible problem
with maintaining erroneous judgments: the possibility that such a judgment will unfairly
operate to preclude a party who has repeatedly defended itself successfully in multi-party
or repeat litigation. See Brainerd Currie, Mutuality of Collateral Estoppe: Limits of the
Bernhard Doctrine, 9 STAN. L. REV. 281 (1957) (describing example of litigant who, having
been successful in defending twenty-five lawsuits, loses the twenty-sixth and is thereafter
precluded from defending itself on the basis of offensive nonmutual collateral estoppel).
To the extent that this result is unfair, the problem seems to lie primarily with the appli-
cation of collateral estoppel to multiple-plaintiff lawsuits. See Michael D. Green, The Inabil-
ity of Offensive Collateral Estoppel to Fulfill its Promise: An Examination of Estoppel in Asbestos
Litigation, 70 IOWA L. REV. 141, 144-45 (1984) (suggesting it may be inappropriate to
apply offensive collateral estoppel to asbestos litigation).
141 We might expect to be able to distinguish these compromises by the terms of the
settlement. Se e.g., Transcript, Bonner Malk supra note 31, at 10 (counsel for U.S.
Bancorp characterizing settlement in which losing party "essentially pays the full amount
of the judgment" as "in fact not a settlement"). But see Purcell v. Bankatlantic Fin. Corp.
(S.D. Fla) (Nos. 89-1284, 89-1605, 89-1850), discussed supra notes 79-82. In PurelL the
losing party characterized the settlement as a compromise even though it had agreed to
pay the full amount of the jury verdict. See Plaintiffs' Responsive Memorandum, Levan, su-
pro note 71, at 5-6 (characterizing settlement as a compromise because the settlement
amount was substantially less than the original amount in controversy); Defendants'
Opening Memorandum in Support of Their Motion for Summary Judgment upon Magis-
trate Judge's Reconsideration Thereof at 6, Levan v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc. (S.D. Fla.)
(No. 92-0325-CIV-ATKINS) ("The Stipulation of Settlement . . . calls for Levan and BFC
to pay the class eight million dollars--the full amount of the damages assessed by the
jury against them in the securities fraud action.").
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ing vacatur, we permit the parties not to manipulate but to rid
the system of weak or erroneous cases more efficiently than
through appeal."
"Why should we allow the litigants to make that judgment?"
Eduardo persisted. "If litigants are unwilling to settle prior to trial
because of the novelty or complexity of the issues presented, can
we trust them to determine at the time of appeal that there is
something wrong with the trial court's decision? It seems to be
that the litigants' openness to settlement is far more likely to be
influenced by resources, willingness to continue litigation, con-
cerns about timing of any relief, and so on-like your earlier
example of George Neary."
"Surely the likelihood of success upon appeal will also be a
factor," I insisted.
"Even if we believe that litigants vacate only in hard cases with
aberrational results, we cannot condone that process. First, I don't
trust the litigants, particularly in difficult cases, to recognize an
aberrational result. 42 Would you consider the recent verdict
against McDonalds aberrational?"
"You mean the case in which the jury awarded almost three
million dollars in punitive damages because it found McDonalds'
coffee too hot?" It's certainly a weird result," I agreed.
"But does that suggest vacatur of the judgment is particularly
appropriate if the parties now settle? Second, hard cases involve
precisely the expenditure of time and effort that justifies preserva-
tion of the result. These are the cases in which the public infor-
mational value of the decisions is so important."
"What about the saying that hard cases make bad law?" I
asked.
"Proponents of vacatur would like us to believe that." But a
142 See Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth. v. One Parcel of Land, No. HAR 88-
618, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18485, at *12 (D. Md. Oct. 22, 1993) (observing, in connec-
tion with its refusal to vacate, that "perhaps this Court erred in its interpretation or
application of the law concerning severance damages, but that is a determination proper-
ly left for the Fourth Circuit, not private agreement.").
143 See, e.g., Big Juy Award for Coffee Bum, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 19, 1994, at D5 (de-
scribing verdict); Juiy Says Coffee Was too Hot, USA TODAY, Aug. 19, 1994, at IB (same).
The jury verdict was subsequently reduced by the court. See Court Refuses to Raise Award
for Coffee Spil4 CHI. TRIB., Oct. 14, 1994, at 3; see also Michael S. Froman, Spilled and
Burned: Not Open and Shut, CHI. DAILY L. BULL, Oct. 13, 1994, at 6 (describing factors
that influence jury verdicts).
144 Vacatur returns a difficult legal issue to its former state of ambiguity. This result
has been defended on the basis that it is better to have an issue unresolved than re-
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litigant can always argue to a subsequent court that the prior
decision is unreliable. And for decisional law to develop, our sys-
tem must retain the novel cases, which are often the hard cases.
Vacatur is unnecessary in cases in which the result is obvious, and
those cases are likely to be settled before trial anyway."
"That's true," I agreed. "The reason so few civil cases go to
trial is that litigation costs reduce the value of the judgment for
both litigants. If the parties can agree on a range of possible out-
comes, settlement is the economically efficient solution."14
"So if a case goes to trial, it is often because the litigants had
very different expectations about the likely result.46 In that case,
one side is likely to view the result as aberrational.
" 14 7
"Which may be how the government views the result in your
case. Speaking of your case, we should get back to it. I may be
able to avoid preparing for class, but eventually I have to go teach
it."
solved incorrectly. Commentators have identified a value, however, in well-developed and
predictable rules of law which is distinct from thq law's substantive content. For example,
the well-developed and predictable nature of Delaware corporation law has been de-
scribed as a rationale for incorporating in Delaware regardless of whether Delaware's
rules are substantively superior. See, e.g., Barry E. Adler, Financial and Political Theories of
American Corporate Bankruptcy, 45 STAN. L. REv. 311, 339 (1993); Melvin Aron Eisenberg,
The Structure of Corporation Law, 89 COLUM. L. REv. 1461, 1508 (1989); Jonathan R. Macey
& Geoffrey P. Miller, Toward an Interest-Group Theory of Delaware Corporate Law, 65 TEX. L.
REv. 469, 505-09 (1987).
145 See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to Legal Procedure and Judicial
Administration, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 399, 417-18 & n.27 (1973) (two parties with any common
bargaining range "rarely" fail to settle); George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection
of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 17 (1984) ("In litigation, as in gambling,
agreement over the outcome leads parties to drop out.").
146 See, e.g., Steven C. Salop & Lawrence J. White, Economic Analysis of Private Antitrust
Litigation, 74 GEO. LJ. 1001, 1027 (1986) (uncertainty about the outcome of a trial
makes the parties less likely to settle); Claire Finkelstein, Note, Financial Distress as a
Noncooperative Game: A Proposal for Overcoming Obstacles to Private Workouts, 102 YALE L.J.
2205, 2211 (1993) (suggesting that possible explanation for low level of settlement in
Chapter 11 litigation is existence of greater uncertainty about bankruptcy law); see also
Lucian Bebchuk, Litigation and Settlement Under Imperfect Information, 15 RAND J. ECoN. 404
(1984).
147 This leads to the question of how the parties' expectations are affected by trial.
Economists often assume that trial resolves the uncertainty associated with a novel legal
position or disputed issue of fact, allowing the parties to agree on a post-trial settlement
range. See Fisch, Rewriting History, supra note 5, at 635. It is possible for one or both par-
ties, however, to view the trial court judgment as aberrational. Such an assessment is
likely to affect the post-trial settlement process.
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IV. FACING THE FACT OF VACATUR-EDUARDO CONSIDERS How
TO DEAL WITH THE GOVERNMENT'S REQUEST
"I appreciate your taking all this time to talk with me about
vacatur. Hopefully it isn't at the expense of your students,"
Eduardo said. "But even understanding the general principles of
vacatur, I'm not sure how to respond to the government's re-
quest."
"Why is the government seeking vacatur of the trial court
decision?" I asked. "Since the case was resolved, the government
can't be concerned about res judicata, as it was in Munsingwear.
And the doctrine of nonmutual collateral estoppel doesn't apply
to the government," so the other potential litigants can't make
preclusive use of your case."
"I think the government is primarily concerned about the
influence of this decision in subsequent cases," Eduardo mused.
"You probably hit the nail on the head when you said the govern-
ment views the case as aberrational. The government attorneys
have repeatedly warned me that the case will not stand up on
appeal."
"Even though the case is not technically binding as precedent,
it is likely to be influential because it breaks new legal ground. If
the decision remains on the books, it makes it more difficult for
the government to take a contrary approach in a subsequent case.
The government has been extremely conscious of the difficulty of
continuing to espouse legal arguments that have been rejected by
the courts, and this concern has led it to become a major defend-
er of postsettlement vacatur."
"So the government's request in my case is not unusual?"
Eduardo asked.
"Quite the contrary.'49 Not only does the government have
substantial experience with vacatur as a litigant, but it has champi-
oned routine vacatur as an amicus in Kaisha and Bonner MalV"
"I would have thought the government would have opposed
vacatur, based on the factors we discussed earlier, as contrary to
the public interest in preserving the finality of decisions and con-
serving judicial resources," Eduardo said.
148 United States v. Mendoza, 464 U.S. 154, 158 (1984).
149 See, e.g., Stipulation [of Settlement before the District Court] at 10, Appendix to
Joint Motion, Schoolcra,' supra note 8 (conditioning settlement on vacatur of lower court
decisions).
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"That was my initial reaction as well," I admitted. "Apparently
the government's interests as a litigant overrode any need to de-
fend the public values threatened by vacatur.'50 In explaining its
position to the Supreme Court, the government explained that it
'is a party to a far greater number of cases on a nationwide basis
than even the most litigious private entity.'"5
"So the government is the classic 'repeat player,'" Eduardo
responded." 2
'Yes, and your victory will make it harder for the government
to deal with the homeless in subsequent litigation. You recognized
that by characterizing your case as a significant victory not just for
your clients, but for the homeless in general."
"I think that's accurate. The case sends a message both about
the rights of the homeless and the ability of the poor to prevail
against the power and resources of the government. I suppose that
message is what the government is trying to take away. If the deci-
sion is vacated, the government will try to proceed against other
homeless people the same way it proceeded against my clients."
"That's right," I said. "Of course, other homeless tenants
could always make the same argument that you made."
"The homeless have limited legal services available to them. I
think we were fortunate in being able to raise and litigate this
issue successfully, but I'm not confidant that the average pro bono
lawyer will be able to make the case successfully with no available
precedent. I would hope the existence of this decision would en-
courage them to try," Eduardo said.
"If you believe the issue is worth defending on behalf of the
homeless, why not simply refuse to settle? You said that your origi-
nal clients had already been given adequate housing, so you aren't
compelled to agree to settlement and vacatur on their account."
"If we don't settle, the government will pursue its appeal,"
Eduardo explained. "My first problem with that is my reluctance
to devote additional resources to a case when the needs of our
150 Alternatively, the government's position may be defended on the basis of the
value of acceding to the parties' wishes and promoting settlement. See U.S. Amicus Brief,
Kaisha, supra note 89, at 15 (arguing that vacatur promotes settlement); id. at 27 (argu-
ing that parties' interest in resolving dispute outweighs any public interest in the deci-
sion).
151 Id. at I (quoting United States v. Mendoza, 464 U.S. 154, 159 (1984)); U.S. Ami-
cus Brief, Bonner Mall, supra note 23, at 1.
152 Professor Resnik describes the government as a "repeat player par excellence."
Resnik, Whose Judgment?, supra note 50, at 1489.
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tenants have been met. It's laudable to defend cases on the
grounds of principle or to make the world a better place for fu-
ture claimants, but the Legal Services Center's mission is a more
narrow one. Our limited resources are supposed to be devoted to
addressing discrete legal problems of identifiable individuals, not
to engage in pro-active rights-oriented litigation. We leave those
issues for organizations like the ACLU."
"I can understand your concern with starting down that road,"
I acknowledged. "But here you have a readily identifiable class of
potential plaintiffs who will benefit from your defense of this deci-
sion. Moreover, the bulk of resources necessary to defend this case
has already been expended at the trial level. Surely defending the
decision on appeal will not prove overwhelmingly burdensome?"
"Not if that were the only problem," Eduardo replied. "I also
wonder if the decision will stand up on appeal. The trial court
judge was a fairly liberal Carter-appointee, and I'm not sure her
reasoning will be accepted by the appellate court. If the decision
is reversed on appeal, the homeless will be worse off than if the
decision is vacated."
"You've identified a valid concern. An adverse appellate court
decision is likely to be quite damaging to your cause. In addition
to its greater visibility and credibility, it will have greater
precedential value, making it difficult for tenants who did not
participate in the original case to raise similar challenges on their
own."
"Isn't it unfair for the government to force me into this posi-
tion?" Eduardo questioned.
"Well, as you've admitted, the government can always proceed
with its appeal and seek reversal of the trial court decision on the
merits. I assume you wouldn't view that as unfair."
"No," Eduardo agreed.
"The government is simply giving you the option of avoiding
defending the decision on appeal. You might view the government
as doing you a favor rather than forcing you into an unfair
choice."
"So you're saying that I can't avoid vacatur unless I'm willing
to devote the resources to pursuing an appeal that is both unnec-
essary and potentially destructive to my cause."
"That's right. This appeal is unnecessary because your clients
are no longer homeless. I'd forgotten that," I mused. "Maybe you
do have an alternative."
"The mootness issue," replied Eduardo, anticipating my next
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thought. "I could argue that the case should be dismissed on
appeal as moot and that, under Karcher v. May, the mootness does
not result from happenstance but from deliberate actions by the
government." He began typing rapidly. "If there is no settlement
agreement, Nestle technically isn't controlling, and the court would-
n't be compelled to vacate. I think we may have something here."
"The government is likely to respond with the same argu-
ments it made in Bonner Mall" I warned him. "The government
has typically taken the position that vacatur is generally appropri-
ate when a case becomes moot pending appeal, citing
Munsingwear.55 According to the government, this is true even if
the mootness results from the conduct of the parties."" 4
"That reminds me, you said two Justices had dissented from
the dismissal in Kaisha, but you never told me what they decided,"
Eduardo remembered. "Did they reach the merits? Is there any-
thing in that opinion that I can use to oppose vacatur in this
case?"
"I suppose I didn't think the dissent's view of the merits in
Kaisha was too important. It's only the view of two Justices, and
one of them, Justice Blackmun, is no longer on the Court."
"Where the standard set by the Supreme Court is unclear, the
opinion of even a single Justice can bind the lower courts,"
Eduardo explained. "Remember the Third Circuit opinion in
Planned Parenthood v. Casey?55 The court, in a fascinating analysis
of the stare decisis effect of plurality and splintered opinions, con-
cluded it was obligated to follow the reasoning of Justice
O'Connor in the recent abortion cases,'56 because her opinion
provided the narrowest grounds necessary to secure a majority of
the Court."57
"True, but Justice O'Connor was part of the majority in the
153 See U.S. Amicus Brief, Kaisha, supra note 89, at 9.
154 Id. at 12-13.
155 947 F.2d 682 (3d Cir. 1991).
156 E.g., Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 455 (1990) (O'Connor, J., concurring);
Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 530 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concur-
ring).
157 See Planned Parenthood, 947 F.2d at 692-94 (describing procedure for identifying
precedent from plurality and splintered Supreme Court opinions); id. at 719 (concluding
that Justice O'Connor's standard represented the narrowest grounds in the majority and
is therefore "at present the law of the land"); Blum v. Witco Chem. Corp., 888 F.2d 975,
981 (3d Cir. 1989) ("Although there is some awkwardness in attributing precedential
value to an opinion of one Supreme Court justice to which no other justice adhered, it
is the usual practice when that is the determinative opinion . . . ").
[Vol. 70:2
VANISHING PRECEDENT
abortion cases," I responded. "The key to that reasoning is that a
single Justice may issue the determinative opinion in a case, but
only where he or she joins in the judgment. Justice Stevens' opin-
ion in Kaisha is a dissent."
"But, because the majority didn't reach the merits; Justice
Stevens' opinion isn't a real dissent."
"Well, for whatever it's worth, Justice Stevens did reach the
merits in Kaisha He concluded that the Federal Circuit's practice
of routinely granting the parties' motions to vacate settled cases
was objectionable and inappropriate."'-
"Did he base his decision on the policy considerations we've
discussed?" Eduardo asked.
"His discussion of the merits was only two paragraphs long," I
said, "but it incorporated a number of the factors we talked about.
Essentially, he came out against routine vacatur for two reasons.
First, he said that the discretion of the court to vacate a judgment
should only be exercised if vacatur would serve the public inter-
est."
"Implicitly rejecting the notion that the judgment is the pri-
vate property of the litigants, to dispose of as they will?" Eduardo
interjected.
"Justice Stevens explicitly stated that precedents are not the
property of private litigants. He went on to reject the argument
that a policy of routine vacatur will encourage settlement, finding
that although the availability of vacatur might affect the terms of
some settlements, it was unlikely to affect the number of cases
settled. He also observed, as you did, that the settlement through
vacatur represents a false economy if subsequent courts have to
relitigate previously decided issues."159
"Did Justice Stevens articulate standards for the lower courts
to apply in ruling on a motion to vacate?" Eduardo asked.
"He didn't set forth any precise formula, but he did reject the
policy of routinely granting motions to vacate. The opinion con-
cludes with the point that the 'public interest in preserving the
work product of the judicial system should always at least be
weighed in the balance before such a motion is granted.'"1
6
0
"It sounds as if at least one Justice is convinced that routine
158 Izumi Seimitsu Kogyo Kabushiki Kaisha v. United States Philips Corp., 114 S. Ct.
425, 431 (1993) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
159 Id. at 431-32.
160 Id. at 432.
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vacatur is contrary to the public interest," Eduardo speculated.
"Nonetheless, I don't see how his opinion can be binding on lower
courts," I said, "although I admit that the Second Circuit seemed to be
strongly influenced by it in its recent decision in Manufacturers
Hanover Trust Co. v. Yanakas."'
16
"So there have been lower court decisions on vacatur since
Kaisha?"
"Yes. Manufacturers Hanover was, I believe, the first case to
address post-settlement vacatur after the Kaisha decision. In Manufac-
turers Hanover, the litigants settled their case after the Second Circuit
had filed its opinion and then jointly moved for vacatur."' 62
"I thought the Second Circuit routinely granted such requests in
the interest of encouraging settlement," Eduardo said.
"The court distinguished Nestle on the basis that Nestle involved
vacatur of a district court decision.'63 The public interest in favor of
preserving the decision is greater, the court said, when a judgment has
received appellate scrutiny."
"I can see a basis for distinguishing between vacatur of a district
court decision and an appellate judgment, but I'm not sure the differ-
ence is all that great," Eduardo reflected.
'"That's why the Manufacturers Hanover opinion is interesting. In
addition to adopting a different rule for motions to vacate appellate
decisions, the Second Circuit took the opportunity to expound on the
public interests inherent in a judicial decision and the destructive effect
of vacatur on those interests, citing Justice Stevens' dissent in
Kaisha.'" Although it didn't overrule Nestle, the court's approach in
Manufacturers Hanover was almost the direct opposite."
"That suggests there's hope for me to get a dismissal without
vacatur in my case after all," Eduardo said eagerly. "Maybe the tide is
turning even in the Second Circuit, and courts will be amenable to my
argument that mootness doesn't require vacatur of the district court
opinion."
"Given the Second Circuit's reliance on Justice Stevens' opinion in
161 11 F.3d 381 (2d Cir. 1993).
162 The settlement was reached prior to the issuance of the mandate; therefore, the court
still had jurisdiction. Id. at 382.
163 Id. at 384.
164 See id. at 384 (citing Kaisha, 114 S. Ct. at 431 (Stevens, J., dissenting)) (arguing that
allowing party with deep pocket to buy its way out of a precedent is improper use of judicial
system); id. at 385 (citing Kaisha, 114 S. Ct. at 431 (Stevens, J., dissenting)) (concluding that
public interest in judicial decision may outweigh interest in promoting settlement); id. (citing
Kaisha, 114 S. Ct. at 431-32 (Stevens, J., dissenting)) (acknowledging that promise of judicial
economy provided by routine vacatur may be illusory, again citing Justice Stevens' dissent).
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Kaisha, it may also consider his specific rejection of the government's
argument that mootness automatically compels vacatur.165 Justice
Stevens distinguished Kaisha from Munsingwear and concluded that the
principles justifying vacatur upon mootness do not apply when the
mootness is 'achieved by purchase."' 6
'That reasoning could be important when the Court decides
Bonner Mall," Eduardo observed. "Well, you've given me plenty to
work with. What time did you say your class was?"
"It started two minutes ago," I realized, looking at my watch. I
frantically began to scour the office for my class notes, casebook, etc.
When I looked up, Eduardo was gone.
POSTSCRIPT
Eduardo vanished as completely as a vacated decision. Reflecting
later on our conversation, I thought about his characterization of routine
vacatur as manipulation of the judicial system. I wondered if his dis-
taste for judicial sanction of a system in which the litigants can buy
and sell precedents was a function of his ideological views. And I
wondered whether, if it reached the issue, the Supreme Court would
view it with similar concern.
165 The Second Circuit stated that Munsingwear did not compel vacatur even of district
court judgments when a case is settled pending appeal and characterized its holding in Nestle
as an exercise of discretion. 11 F.3d at 384.
166 Kaisha, 114 S. Ct. at 431.

